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Essay
ON LISTENING TO THE KULTURKAMPF, OR,
HOW AMERICA OVERRULED BOWERS V.




Is Bowers v. Hardwick1 still good law? It’s been fourteen years
since the decision upholding Georgia’s sodomy law knocked the wind
out of the gay rights movement and signaled an end to the expansion
of the Supreme Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence. Four-
teen years, and much has changed: a largely different Court; a subse-
quent “gay rights case,” Romer v. Evans;2 but also an exponential rise
in openly gay television characters, Hollywood celebrities, and politi-
cians; a widespread extension by corporations of family benefits to
gay and lesbian domestic partners; and unprecedented public debate
on gay marriage, gays in the military, gays at the office, gays just
about everywhere. Is the old, quaint reasoning of Bowers still the law
of the land?
Upon close reading, I think it is impossible to maintain that the
1996 decision of Romer v. Evans, which voided as unconstitutional a
Colorado state constitutional amendment banning gay rights ordi-
nances, overruled Bowers. Different in tone, Romer never mentioned
Bowers, the cases rest on different grounds (Romer on the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, Bowers on the Due Process Clause), and the laws at
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issue functioned differently (the Georgia statute in Bowers governed
conduct; the Colorado amendment in Romer, status). The Georgia
law was deemed valid because it did not interfere with a protected
right; the Colorado provision was deemed unconstitutional because it
created classes of individuals. These are not contradictory cases; they
are complementary. After Romer, Bowers was healthier than ever.
But if we take a fresh look at Bowers in the context of the
Court’s theories of substantive due process, the case’s foundations
begin to look quite shaky. Remember that Bowers only deemed “fa-
cetious” the argument that homosexual sodomy is a fundamental
right after noting that the claim failed a threshold requirement for
qualifying as such a right under the Fourteenth Amendment—
namely, a relation to “family, marriage, or procreation.”3 But times
have changed since 1986. In 1986, the kulturkampf4 that Justice Scalia
would later describe in his Romer dissent5 had not yet begun in ear-
nest; it was hard for Justice White even to imagine a connection be-
tween homosexual sodomy and the areas of life traditionally pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Not so in 2000, a time at which
America has thousands of recognized gay families; gay domestic part-
nerships recognized by corporations and many municipalities; gay
adoptive parents; not to mention gay television characters and mem-
bers of Congress. American culture’s definition of the “family” has
gradually changed in the last fifteen years to the point where not only
is “it difficult to speak of an average American family,” as the Court
recently noted,6 but where the determination of what constitutes a
“family” has itself become a matter of debate, and thus, is a pro-
tected, personal decision that the state cannot control.
3. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
4. The term kulturkampf, strictly speaking, means a “conflict between civil government
and religious authorities especially over control of education and church appointments.”
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 648 (10th ed. 1993). The original kul-
turkampf was an attempt by German nationalists led by Otto von Bismarck to crush the growing
political power of the Catholic Church. See Jack Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE
L.J. 2313, 2319 & n.17 (1997) (citing GORDON A. CRAIG, GERMANY 1866-1945, at 70-78, 280-81
(1978); E.J. PASSANT, A SHORT HISTORY OF GERMANY 1815-1945, at 88-90 (1960); HELMUT
WALSER SMITH, GERMAN NATIONALISM AND RELIGIOUS CONFLICT: CULTURE, IDEOLOGY,
POLITICS, 1870-1914, at 19-20, 37-50 (1995)). As Balkin has noted, the term has come to be used
more loosely as referring to “any struggle between groups over a common national culture.”
Balkin, supra, at 2319. It is in this wider sense that Justice Scalia—and I—use the term. See infra
note 195 (noting the difference between this usage and that of William Eskridge).
5. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2059 (2000).
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This is not to say that public endorsements of gay families are
constitutionally required, or even desirable. Nor is it to say that there
is agreement as to what constitutes a “family”—far from it. Rather,
the argument is only that the definition of “family,” in terms of the
way the word is actually used in contemporary society, reasonably
may include homosexual couples (and their adopted children), a
statement that may not have been true fifteen years ago. As such, a
legislature cannot define away gay families by proposing a limiting
definition, any more than they can censor political speech by labeling
it apolitical; and since gay sexual activity is as important to gay fami-
lies as straight sex is to straight families, laws that would prohibit such
activity are unconstitutional absent a compelling state interest to jus-
tify them. All this without any extension of substantive due process—
a doctrine sprung from a constitutional provision whose elasticity ap-
pears to have reached its limit. And all this by the logic of Bowers
alone. Precisely because the kulturkampf does matter constitution-
ally, the premises relied upon by the Court in 1986 are no longer valid
today.
In the pages to come, I want to develop this argument and
observe where it takes us in our understanding of substantive due
process and stare decisis, and, finally, examine the place of “law” in a
society where media and popular culture dynamically shape our self-
conceptions. Part I analyzes Bowers and Romer, both from a legal
and from a sociological-legal perspective, and argues that the two
cases do not contradict one another. Part II wades into the miasma of
substantive due process, emerges with a few coherent strands of
doctrine, and brings to bear the doctrine’s emphasis on the family to
Bowers, arguing that to define a family right out of existence by
unjustifiably limiting the definition of “family” flies in the face of the
notion of a protected right and produces an incoherent method of
defining constitutional terms. Part II also addresses the Court’s
doctrine of stare decisis and how it envisions precisely the sort of
change that has occurred since Bowers. Finally, I ask in Part III
whether any of this matters anymore—whether old, quaint Bowers
and its antiquated emphasis on anti-sodomy laws really has any
relevance in the days after Ellen,7 Matthew Shepard,8 and Tinky-
7. ABC television series, 1994-98.
8. Matthew Shepard, a 21-year-old student at the University of Wyoming, was lured from
a gay bar by two men and subsequently tied to a ranch fence, robbed, pistol-whipped, burned,
and left to die after having pleaded for his life; he was discovered 18 hours later, and died after
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Winky.9 In particular, I think the collision of popular culture and
constitutional jurisprudence helps remind us that, occasionally, law
follows society rather than leads it—that sometimes, Tinky-Winky is,
and should be, more important than Justice Scalia. The implosion of
Bowers in the face of shifting definitions of “family” tells us much
about the connections, or disconnects, between law and society;
between legal terms and their conventional definitions; and, in the
mode of Robert Cover,10 among disparate communities that construct
values through law. The role constitutional adjudication plays in the
evolution of such communities may on occasion be a supporting one,
as societal debates render old law seemingly obsolete. Yet sometimes
law speaks to popular culture, and sometimes it ought to listen.
I.  BOWERS, ROMER, AND THE SOCIAL MEANING OF
CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
A. Bowers v. Hardwick
Rarely has so much sprung from so little. The facts of Bowers v.
Hardwick, to relate them here in their briefest form, were mundane,
five days in a coma. See James Brooke, Gay Man Dies from Attack, Fanning Outrage and De-
bate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1998, at A1. The brutality of the murder became a rallying point for
the opponents of homophobia—even convincing such ardent foes of gay rights as the Rev. Jerry
Falwell to urge moderation and mutual respect. See Frank Rich, Journal: Has Jerry Falwell Seen
the Light?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1999, at A17 (discussing the Rev. Falwell’s reaction to the Mat-
thew Shepard murder).
9. The Teletubbies puppet Tinky-Winky provoked a miniature firestorm of controversy
when the National Liberty Journal, a publication run by the Rev. Jerry Falwell, produced “evi-
dence that the creators of the series intend for Tinky-Winky to be a gay role model,” to wit:
though his voice is “obviously that of a boy,” he “is purple—the gay pride color; and his antenna
is shaped like a triangle—the gay-pride symbol.” Parents Alert (Feb. 1999) <http://www.liberty.
edu/chancellor/nlj/feb99/politics2.htm> (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Though the
Teletubbies’ creators replied that the sexless, non-human characters have no genders—let alone
sexual orientations—Rev. Falwell defended the outing of Tinky-Winky by stating that “this is
one more in many, many building blocks where we have little boys running around with purses
and acting effeminate and leaving the idea that the masculine male, the feminine female is out
and gay is OK, which Christians do not agree with.” Today (NBC television broadcast, Feb. 11,
1999), quoted in Timothy E. Lin, Note, Social Norms and Judicial Decisionmaking: Examining
the Role of Narratives in Same-Sex Adoption Cases, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 739, 739 (1999); see also
Lawrie Mifflin, Falwell Takes on the Teletubbies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1999, at C11 (discussing
Rev. Falwell’s statements and the reaction of a representative of the Teletubbies’ television
program).
10. Robert Cover concluded that although “formal institutions of the law, and the conven-
tions of a social order are, indeed, important to that world,” legal institutions and laws must be
“understood in the context of the narratives that give [them] meaning.” Robert M. Cover, The
Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4-5 (1983).
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even comically so. Michael Hardwick had been ticketed for public
drinking, but failed to appear for his hearing. Georgia police obtained
a warrant for his arrest and paid a house call. Entering through an
open door, they found Hardwick in flagrante delicto with another gen-
tleman. Both men were arrested for violating Georgia’s criminal sod-
omy statute.11 Though the District Attorney decided not to present
Hardwick’s case to the grand jury, Hardwick sought a declaratory
judgment challenging the sodomy law’s validity. After a somewhat
tricky case history, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and consid-
ered Hardwick’s claim.12
The opinions in Bowers merit close reading. First, and critically,
Michael Hardwick was the only respondent in the case. He had origi-
nally been joined by a heterosexual couple who claimed to have been
“chilled and deterred” from engaging in sodomy by the Georgia law,13
but they were found to lack standing and did not appeal that decision
to the Supreme Court. As Justice White explained in his majority
opinion, “The only claim properly before the Court, therefore, is
Hardwick’s challenge to the Georgia statute as applied to consensual
homosexual sodomy. We express no opinion on the constitutionality
of the Georgia statute as applied to other acts of sodomy.”14 This
seemingly innocuous point enabled the critical hinge of Bowers’s
logic: the connection, or lack thereof, between “homosexual sodomy”
and “family, marriage, and procreation.” Were the case actually just
about “sodomy,” as the Georgia statute certainly was, and as Justice
Blackmun noted in his dissent,15 this disconnect would have been
harder to defend; sodomy seems not to differ meaningfully from
other protected acts of sexual behavior. Moreover, the focus on ho-
mosexual sodomy made Bowers into “the gay case,” rather than just
11. See PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS: SIXTEEN AMERICANS
WHO FOUGHT THEIR WAY TO THE SUPREME COURT 395-96 (1988); see also Mark E. Papado-
poulos, Inkblot Jurisprudence: Romer v. Evans as a Great Defeat for the Gay Rights Movement,
7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 165, 170 (1997) (stating that the police officer reported seeing
Hardwick and another man engage in fellatio). Interestingly, there is some evidence that the
public drinking charge was fabricated and that the whole affair was actually a result of police
harassment. See IRONS, supra, at 395.
12. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986).
13. Id. at 188 & n.2. Interestingly, Hardwick’s partner, with whom he was caught in fla-
grante, was a closeted, married schoolteacher from North Carolina who begged the police not to
tell his wife (or anyone else) and pleaded to lesser charges. See Mary Anne Case, Couples and
Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on the Legal History of Litigating for Lesbian and
Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 1643, 1652 (1995).
14. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188 n.2.
15. See id. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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“the sodomy case”; thus, the dropping of the straight claimants de-
termined Bowers’s cultural meaning.16
Proceeding from its premise that the case is about “whether the
Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals
to engage in sodomy,”17 the Bowers opinion rejects the theory that
previous cases about “child rearing and education,” “family relation-
ships,” procreation, marriage, contraception, and abortion could be
read to create “a constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts
of sodomy.”18 Why not? Because “[n]o connection between family,
marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on
the other has been demonstrated, either by the Court of Appeals or
by respondent.”19
From this lack of connection flows the rest of the opinion. Once
(1) the family, rather than those activities “central to a part of an in-
dividual’s life,”20 is defined as the nest of substantive due process
rights and (2) family and sodomy are decoupled, the case becomes
about whether there is a basis for an independent “right of homo-
sexuals to engage in acts of sodomy” either “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty”21 or, alternatively, among those liberties that are
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”22 In other
words, because there is no family connection, there must be an inde-
pendent right—a much harder case for Hardwick to make.
What follows is a notorious lapse in reasoning. Justice White
convincingly refutes the notion that a right to sodomy is “deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” by barraging the reader
with over five dozen statutory and common-law prohibitions on the
act, some dating back to the eighteenth century.23 But he then con-
cludes that “to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is ‘deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history or tradition’ or ‘implicit in the concept
16. See Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the
Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073, 1102-03 (1988); Janet E. Hal-
ley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L.
REV. 1721, 1741-45 (1995).
17. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
18. Id. at 191.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 191 (emphasis added) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26
(1937)).
22. Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (Powell, J., plu-
rality opinion)).
23. Id. at 193-94.
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of ordered liberty’ is, at best, facetious.”24 This elision of “history or
tradition” and “the concept of ordered liberty” moves anti-sodomy
laws from “is” to “ought,” from historical practice to the realm of or-
dered liberty.25 It holds that 200 years of a practice magically render it
in harmony with the trans-historical concept of ordered liberty, a
proposition squarely contradicted by Loving v. Virginia,26 which de-
clared unconstitutional miscegenation laws that had been on the
books in many states since the Founding, by Brown, which likewise
changed decades of common practice in the education context, and by
common moral intuition.27 It also avoids the need for any theoretical
discussion about the nature of substantive due process—precisely the
subject of several pages of Justice Blackmun’s dissent.28
Finally, because there is no protected right, Georgia’s law need
pass only rational basis scrutiny. Anticipating the contours of the
Romer debate, Justice White states, without much explanation, that
the anti-sodomy law passes rational basis scrutiny because laws are
“constantly based on notions of morality.”29 That is, as long as the
right affected by a law is not a fundamental one, a “moral” choice—
particularly one made by twenty-five states—is sufficient justifica-
tion.30
In dissent, Justice Blackmun accuses the majority of at least three
mistakes of reasoning. First, Blackmun argues, it miscasts the issue at
hand from one of “the right to be let alone,” or even “to engage in
sodomy” generally, to the “right to engage in homosexual sodomy”
specifically, thereby misunderstanding the thrust of the substantive
due process doctrine.31 Second, it conflates the quantity and duration
of moral opinions with the validity thereof: “I cannot agree that either
24. Id. at 194 (emphasis added).
25. There is abundant evidence that even on purely historical grounds, Justice White’s
opinion is factually incorrect. See Goldstein, supra note 16, at 1082-85; Halley, supra note 16, at
1759-67.
26. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
27. Our country had a long history of slavery, for example, which few would argue does not
offend the concept of ordered liberty. See Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J.
1493, 1495-96 (1988) (arguing that tying constitutional thought to “static” ideas of morality
would have closed American society off to blacks).
28. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 203-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 196.
30. See id. Presumably, some moral judgments are not as stable as “the sodomy laws of
some 25 States,” although the Court’s opinion does not mention what they might be. Chief Jus-
tice Burger one-ups the Court in his concurring opinion, by tracing the laws against sodomy to
Roman law and Blackstone. See id. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
31. Id. at 199-201 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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the length of time a majority has held its convictions or the passions
with which it defends them can withdraw legislation from this Court’s
scrutiny.”32
Third, and anticipating the question of animus in Romer, Justice
Blackmun concludes that “[a] state can no more punish private be-
havior because of religious intolerance than it can punish such be-
havior because of racial animus.”33 For Justice Blackmun, a recourse
to vague “morality,” however hoary in nature, is insufficient justifica-
tion for a law, because that “moral” judgment may well spring from
an impermissible source. As we will see, this issue will return in Ro-
mer and will occupy some of our time in the conclusion of this Essay.
Justice Stevens’s little-remarked-upon dissent prefigures Romer
even more clearly. Justice Stevens notes that the Georgia statute pre-
sents two unconstitutional alternatives: either it applies to everyone,
or it must be selectively applied only to homosexuals. In the former
case, the statute runs afoul of Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional,34 Eisenstadt v. Baird,35 and Griswold v. Connecticut.36 In the lat-
ter case, “[a] policy of selective application must be supported by a
neutral and legitimate interest—something more substantial than a
habitual dislike for, or ignorance about, the disfavored group. Neither
the State nor the Court has identified any such interest in this case.”37
For Justice Stevens, the problem is not homosexual sodomy per se,
but the lack of a justification for applying the sodomy law at issue
against homosexual persons. The Romer shift was not far away.
Clearly, Bowers was tremendously important to the development
of substantive due process law and to the trajectory of the gay rights
movement in America. Its substantive import was less clear, however.
Georgia Code Annotated section 16-2-2(a)38 continued to be as unen-
forced as it had been for the past half-century—even Hardwick’s own
violation of the statute went unpunished—until, in a curious twist of
32. Id. at 210 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
33. Id. at 211-12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
34. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
35. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
36. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
37. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 219 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Note that Justice Stevens did not take
the next step—declaring that it would be unconstitutional to single out homosexuals for dis-
crimination. He stated only that neither the Georgia electorate nor the Georgia legislature had
ever expressed an intention to do so. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-2-2(a) (1984).
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events, the Georgia Supreme Court struck it down as unconstitutional
in 1998.39 We should not think that sodomy laws are irrelevant; con-
trary to the myth that sodomy laws are never enforced, some states
still prosecute people for breaking them.40 Sodomy laws continue to
serve as the legal basis for cracking down on men “cruising” for sex in
public areas, raids on bars, and refusals to hire “criminals.”41 Still, this
is nothing compared with the 1950s and early 1960s, when sodomy
laws were strictly enforced, with severe consequences including life
sentences in prison, inclusion in registries of sex offenders, and in-
definite incarcerations in mental institutions.42
More importantly, the act of sodomy itself is, for better or for
worse, well out of the closet. Presidential acts of sodomy are dis-
cussed in excruciating detail on prime time television. Depictions of
the act that would have been shocking a decade ago are now com-
monplace in movies aimed at teenagers and music videos aimed at
anyone. Oprah talks about it. Contemporaneous with the destigmati-
zation of sodomy in popular culture, the battlegrounds of gay rights
have shifted away from the bedroom to the office, to the public
square, and to a fence in Laramie, Wyoming, where Matthew
Shepard was beaten and left to die. If anything, Bowers in the age of
Ellen, Will and Grace and Dawson’s Creek seems like a relic from the
days of Leave it to Beaver.
And yet, Bowers remains an important case in American legal
history. It had seemed, until the Court handed down its decision, that
striking down the sodomy laws was the next logical step for expand-
ing Fourteenth Amendment rights. Moreover, such a decision would
constitute a judicial validation of the 10% of Americans who are es-
timated to have broken a law like section 16-2-2(a) at some point in
39. See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 24-26 (Ga. 1998) (holding, by a vote of 6-1, that the
statute ran afoul of the Georgia Constitution’s Due Process Clause).
40. See Halley, supra note 16, at 1731 n.29 (noting that in 1986, 56 people were incarcerated
in Virginia for sodomy without any finding of force or coercion involved); Debbie Nathan, Sod-
omy for the Masses, THE NATION, Apr. 19, 1999, at 16 (surveying sodomy prosecutions in Texas,
Arkansas, and Puerto Rico).
41. See Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L.
REV. 1551, 1587 (1993); Nathan, supra note 40, at 16. For one local account of sodomy law en-
forcement, see Laurence Hammack, Rulings Clear Way for Sex Trials: State’s Anti-Sodomy Law
Used to Prosecute Men Accused of Seeking Sex in Roanoke Parks, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD
NEWS, May 4, 1999, at B1.
42. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Democracy, Kulturkampf, and the Apartheid of the Closet,
50 VAND. L. REV. 419, 429-31 (1997).
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their lives.43 Instead, Bowers became, and remains, the high-water
mark of substantive due process. As Jed Rubenfeld has written, “the
Court in [Bowers] necessarily drew a line: the right to privacy stops
here.”44 Bowers is thus arguably the point at which the conservative
turn of the Rehnquist Court began, even before Rehnquist began his
tenure as Chief Justice.
Bowers was also a major setback for gay activists’ litigation
strategies and had dramatic ripple effects.45 In the years following
Bowers, courts across the country declined to find constitutional
violations in “gay rights” cases, often reasoning that because sodomy
could be criminalized, discrimination against sodomizers was
constitutional.46 More significantly, the hoped-for legitimization of
gay rights stalled for years, with political consequences ranging from
the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy for gays in the military, which has
in fact led to a dramatic increase in Pentagon investigations and
expulsions of lesbians and gay men,47 to the “Defense of Marriage
43. Ten percent is the figure frequently cited as the percentage of homosexual men in the
U.S. population, a figure derived from a study conducted in the 1940s by Alfred Kinsey. See
generally ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948). This
figure has been consistently attacked as inaccurate. See, e.g., Joseph P. Gudel, Homosexuality:
Fact and Fiction (visited June 6, 2000) <http://www.christiandemocratic.org.au/fed/mirrors/
hmsex_illness.htm> (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (arguing that Kinsey’s study contained
flawed methodology and conclusions). Nevertheless, it is still consistently cited. See, e.g., Elsa
Brenner, The Invisible Population, The Gays Next Door: At Work, Home and School, a Minority
Often Under Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1999, § 14 (Magazine), at 1, 15 (“[I]t is estimated that
about 10 percent of the population is gay.”).
44. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 747 (1989).
45. See Cain, supra note 41, at 1617-40; Mary C. Dunlap, Gay Men and Lesbians Down by
Law in the 1990’s USA: The Continuing Toll of Bowers v. Hardwick, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 1, 11-12 (1994).
46. See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1105-11 (11th Cir. 1997) (allowing Georgia’s
Attorney General to fire a lesbian because she might have a propensity to engage in sodomy,
creating a “bad appearance” for the Attorney General and a conflict of interest in enforcing
sodomy laws); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (upholding a
Navy discharge of a gay seaman because “[a]fter Hardwick it cannot logically be asserted that
discrimination against homosexuals is constitutionally infirm”); see also Courtney G. Joslin,
Equal Protection and Anti-Gay Legislation: Dismantling the Legacy of Bowers v. Hardwick, 32
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 225, 227-29 (1997) (asserting that Bowers “has come to stand for the
principle that discrimination against homosexuals is constitutionally permissible”); Sherene D.
Hannon, Casenote, License to Oppress: The Aftermath of Bowers v. Hardwick is Still Felt To-
day: Shahar v. Bowers, 19 PACE L. REV. 507, 537-39 (1999) (arguing that after Bowers, gay liti-
gants asserting civil rights claims are disadvantaged because of the legal inferences that are
made from their homosexual status).
47. See Robert D. Dodson, Homosexual Discrimination and Gender: Was Romer v. Evans
Really a Victory for Gay Rights?, 35 CAL. W.L. REV. 271, 292-300 (1999); Kenji Yoshino, As-
similationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask,
MICHAELSON.DOC 10/12/00 1:13 PM
2000] LISTENING TO THE KULTURKAMPF 1569
Act.”48 It would be hard to conceive of such measures taking effect in
the wake of a Bowers opinion that found sodomy to be a protected
activity and gays to be a protected class.
Most importantly, although perhaps most difficult to fit into a
doctrinal box, Bowers represented a clear moral statement on the
part of the Supreme Court, and endorsed a set of value judgments
about gays and lesbians. The long list of anti-sodomy laws cited by
Justice White cannot but be read as a not-so-tacit endorsement of
those laws’ contents. After all, they are the “proof” that there is no
fundamental right to sodomy inherent in history, tradition, or the
concept of liberty itself. Imagine what sort of moral impact Loving
would have had if it had upheld the miscegenation law at issue, and
had listed the dozens of miscegenation laws on the books as “proof”
that the values behind the Virginia statute were, in fact, foundational
American beliefs.49 Even if the miscegenation laws were never en-
forced, the marginalization of their opponents would have changed
the character of the civil rights movement. Rather than having the
imprimatur of the legal establishment behind it, the movement would
be cast as opposed to foundational American values, and as promot-
ing an agenda fundamentally at odds with the will of sixteen states (as
of 1967). Loving decided in this way would have provided tremen-
dous social artillery to the opponents of school integration and civil
rights laws, and would have cast the separation of the races as the
product of mainstream American beliefs.
I believe it is in this rather ill-defined sociological arena that the
true significance of Bowers lies. Bowers defined the mainstream and
the margins, just as cases like Loving and Brown had done by defin-
ing themselves in terms of larger claims of equality and freedom.
Only this time, the “crusaders for civil rights” were “facetious” and
the status quo was part of history, tradition, and liberty. This defini-
tion of mainstream and margin was the Supreme Court’s authorita-
Don’t Tell”, 108 YALE L.J. 485, 545-47 (1998); C. Dixon Osburn & Michelle M. Benecke, Con-
duct Unbecoming Continues: The First Year Under “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue” (1995)
<http://www.sldn.org/scripts/sldn.ixe?page=article_0001> (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
48. Pub L. No. 104-199, 100 Stat. 2419 (1996).
49. Justice Stevens noted the analogy between miscegenation laws and anti-sodomy laws in
his dissent from Bowers. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).
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tive statement on what Justice Scalia would later call the kulturkampf
of sexual orientation in America.50
Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that when Romer v. Evans first
appeared, it was seen as in some way “overruling Bowers.”51 As I will
show, I think this claim is 90% inaccurate from a legal point of view—
the only part of Bowers clearly overruled by Romer was Justice
White’s parting statement that “morality,” undefined, unquestioned,
and unexplained, is a legitimate basis for law. Culturally, however,
Romer did send a very different message about gays in America; cul-
turally, the argument that Bowers was overruled may not be so off the
mark.
B. Romer v. Evans
In contrast to the private origin of Bowers, Romer v. Evans be-
gan in the public square, full of sound and fury. Disturbed by provi-
sions in the municipal codes in Aspen and Boulder, Colorado, some
of which had been in place for twenty years, the people of Colorado
voted in 1992 for a referendum known as “Amendment 2.” The
amendment prohibited any state or municipal agency from adopting
any “statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual,
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships
shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of . . . minority status, quota
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.”52 Amend-
ment 2, then, was not an affirmatively discriminatory law (as in Bow-
ers) but a negatively discriminatory one—this was a constitutional
amendment that denied protection to gays, bisexuals, and lesbians,
but appeared not to inflict any particular hardship. As with Bowers,
though, the Court’s characterization of the law at issue was crucial.
50. Indeed, Michael Bowers himself, the Attorney General of Georgia who was the named
petitioner in Bowers, subsequently tried to make a career out of being “that Bowers” in his
failed bid in Georgia’s 1998 gubernatorial election. See Geraldine Baum, Appetite for Scandal
Altering Political Menu, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1999, at A1. Bowers’s candidacy failed, apparently,
due to the revelation that the self-styled “crusader for sexual morality” had carried on a ten-
year affair with his secretary. See id.
51. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Romer’s Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival of War-
ren-Court Activism, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 102 (1996) (claiming that Romer “went beyond a
mere overruling of Bowers” by “reviving local antidiscrimination measures”).
52. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b (1993), quoted in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996).
For a discussion of Romer and its case history prior to the Supreme Court, see Dodson, supra
note 47, at 273-79; Joslin, supra note 46, at 230-33.
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Justice Kennedy, writing for a six-Justice majority,53 saw the amend-
ment not as putting everyone “in the same position,” as Colorado in-
sisted, but as putting homosexuals “in a solitary class with respect to
transactions and relations in both the private and governmental
spheres”54 because “[h]omosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that
others enjoy or may seek without constraint.”55
Ordinarily, the next step would be to determine the standard of
review. But in Romer, Justice Kennedy never examined whether or
not sexual orientation is a “suspect classification,” instead proceeding
directly to the application of rational basis scrutiny—ultimately find-
ing Amendment 2 to fail even under that deferential standard of re-
view. Accordingly, there are two ways to read Romer on this point.
On the one hand, it can be read as announcing that sexual orientation
is not a suspect classification like race, and so only rational basis scru-
tiny need be applied. On the other hand, it might be read as only
stating that since Amendment 2 fails even rational basis scrutiny,
there is no need to decide whether a higher level of scrutiny is war-
ranted. This ambiguity avoids the thorny issue of status in a case that
does not require the decision—indeed, it may have helped get the 6-3
majority—but it does lead to the sort of indeterminacy that we now
face.56
The remainder of the Romer reasoning consists of two steps.
First, Justice Kennedy labeled Amendment 2 as “at once too narrow
and too broad” because it “identifies persons by a single trait and
then denies them protection across the board.”57 Second, by dint of
that overbreadth, Amendment 2 raises “the inevitable inference that
the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of
53. Bowers was a 5-4 decision, written by Justice White, and joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor in the majority. Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens were in dissent. Romer’s majority consisted of Justices Stevens,
O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer; Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Justices
Scalia and Thomas in dissent. Justice Powell said after he retired that he “probably made a mis-
take” by siding with the Bowers majority. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F.
POWELL, JR. 530 (1994).
54. Romer, 517 U.S. at 627.
55. Id. at 631.
56. On heightened scrutiny for gays and lesbians, see Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The
Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 1753 (1996); see
also Barbara J. Flagg, “Animus” and Moral Disapproval: A Comment on Romer v. Evans, 82
MINN. L. REV. 833, 834 (1998) (noting that rational basis review “seemingly requires more,
rather than less, judicial involvement with controversial value choices”).
57. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
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persons affected.”58 While agreeing that “even laws enacted for broad
and ambitious purposes can be explained by reference to legitimate
public policies,”59 Justice Kennedy rejected Colorado’s arguments
that Amendment 2 was about “respect for other citizens,” “freedom
of association,” or “conserving resources to fight discrimination
against other groups,” because, he argued, the broad nature of
Amendment 2 itself belies such claims.60 In other words, while it
might be possible for a broad law to have a rational basis, Amend-
ment 2’s breadth is so wide as to strongly suggest that only “animus”
can explain it.61
This “animus” is the hinge of Justice Scalia’s furious dissent.62
For Justice Scalia, to label as “animus” what may well be a reflective
moral choice on the part of the Colorado populace is both inconsis-
tent with Supreme Court precedent and a flight of interpretive hubris.
In the first place, Justice Scalia claims that Bowers clearly stands for
the proposition that it is okay to treat homosexuals unequally from
heterosexuals, because Bowers upheld a law making “the conduct
that defines the class criminal.”63 “If it is rational to criminalize the
conduct,” he reasons, “surely it is rational to deny special favor and
58. Id. at 634.
59. Id. at 635.
60. Justice Kennedy noted:
The primary rationale the State offers for Amendment 2 is respect for other citizens’
freedom of association, and in particular the liberties of landlords or employers who
have personal or religious objections to homosexuality. Colorado also cites its interest
in conserving resources to fight discrimination against other groups. The breadth of
the amendment is so far removed from these particular justifications that we find it
impossible to credit them.
Id. at 635.
61. It is worth noting that this was not the theory of the Romer plaintiffs, who had alleged
that Amendment 2 violated the right of equal participation in the political process, and who had
won on those grounds below. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1341 (Colo. 1994); Evans v.
Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1282 (Colo. 1993) (both decided on equal protection grounds); see also
Flagg, supra note 56, at 838-40 (discussing generally the plaintiffs’ original arguments against
Amendment 2). The reasoning in Romer appears to have been based on an amicus brief submit-
ted by Laurence Tribe, John Hart Ely, Gerald Gunther, Philip Kurland, and Kathleen Sullivan.
See Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV. 203,
204 & n.6 (1996). On the impermissibility of animosity as a legislative justification, see, for ex-
ample, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985), and United
States v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
62. Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia was joined in dissent by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas.
63. Id. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir.
1987)). The dissent also argues that Amendment 2 only prohibits preferential treatment for ho-
mosexuals, and thus does not place a special disability on them. See id. at 638 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting).
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protection to those with a self-avowed tendency or desire to engage in
the conduct.”64 Second, Justice Scalia states that animus against an ac-
tivity many may find morally repugnant is a legitimate response; for
Justice Scalia, the people of Colorado are “entitled to be hostile to-
ward homosexual conduct,” and thus to people likely to engage in it,65
just as they may be hostile to alcoholics, drug addicts, or those of a
polygamous “orientation.”66 Amendment 2 was thus a “reasonable”
response by the majority to a politically powerful minority that the
Court should not second guess out of “political will.”67
At the heart of the doctrinal debate between Justice Scalia and
Justice Kennedy, then, is the reason for Colorado’s action. Both seem
to agree that considered moral judgment is a permissible basis for a
law (under rational basis scrutiny) but that “animus” is not; the ques-
tion is which is present in Amendment 2. For Justice Kennedy, the
overbreadth of Amendment 2 means animus is the only conceivable
explanation for it. But while Justice Scalia says the majority has “mis-
taken” the “Kulturkampf for a fit of spite,”68 he does not provide a
basis for how to decide which is which.69 Justice Scalia says that gay
people, like polygamists, cause a “perceived social harm.”70 But how
is this “perception” to be evaluated without peering behind the veil of
moral judgment? Amendment 2’s purpose—“to prevent piecemeal
deterioration of the sexual morality favored by a majority of Colora-
64. Id. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia further argues that even if there are gay
people who, for whatever reason, do not engage in criminalizable gay sex, that does not mean
that the statute cannot ever be applied in a valid way to those who do. See id. at 643 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
65. Id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 648 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Note that all but one of the examples which Justice
Scalia cites are of statutes that prohibit the relevant conduct—consuming alcohol, using drugs,
polygamy; they do not set up a “class of persons” disfavored not only with respect to the offen-
sive activity but with regard to housing, or insurance, or any of the other areas of human life
which Justice Scalia himself cites. Only one act, the disenfranchisement of polygamists, ap-
proved by the Court in Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 348 (1890), approaches such a disability.
67. Romer, 517 U.S. at 645-46, 653 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69. See S.I. Strong, Justice Scalia as a Modern Lord Devlin: Animus and Civil Burdens in
Romer v. Evans, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1997) (comparing Justice Scalia’s arguments with
those of Lord Patrick Devlin, who supported the continuation of British anti-sodomy laws on
moral grounds). Unlike Scalia, Devlin set up a series of additional requirements before morality
could be used to justify a law, among them some degree of unanimity and “patient and deliber-
ate decisionmaking.” Id. at 11-13. This would appear to distinguish his approach from Justice
Scalia’s, insofar as it inquires into the substance and procedure of moral reasoning itself, rather
than accepting the output of that reasoning process as ipso facto legitimate.
70. Romer, 517 U.S. at 651 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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dans”71—is, without more, no more “rational” a purpose than “to pre-
vent piecemeal deterioration of the racial purity favored by a majority
of South Carolinians” in Loving, or, if that is too strong, “to prevent
piecemeal deterioration of the sexual morality favored by a majority
of South Carolinians.” Surely there must be some explanation of the
moral choice itself, or at least of its process, in order for the moral
choice to be considered reasonable. Simply calling a choice moral,
and linking it with vague references to scriptural or other religious
traditions, is an insufficient explanation.
In sum, I am mystified by Akhil Amar’s report that with regard
to constitutional scholars, the initial consensus was that “Justice Ken-
nedy won their hearts; Justice Scalia, their heads.”72 Notwithstanding
Justice Scalia’s parsing of nondiscrimination principles, it is his opin-
ion, not Justice Kennedy’s, which makes the emotional plea in Ro-
mer, albeit a plea to emotions other than those of liberal constitu-
tional law scholars. “Moral judgment” is, without more, an
intellectually vapid term, though one with emotional punch, that
masks philosophical, social, theological, intuitional, or psychological
conclusions about a given subject. At least the Romer majority ex-
plains why it deems Colorado’s motive to be animus—the radical
overbreadth of the law.73 Conceivably, moral disapproval that sup-
ported a law reasonably related to that disapproval might not be
“animus” in the constitutionally infirm sense; a clear policy choice re-
flecting a moral vision is clearly distinguishable from a ban on “gay
rights” so overbroad that it cannot possibly reflect a reasoned moral
judgment.74
71. Id. at 653 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Amar, supra note 61, at 204.
73. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
74. Amar argues that Justice Kennedy’s repeated framing of Romer in terms of named
classes and special disabilities suggests a deeper meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. Amar
refers to this meaning as the “attainder principle,” a generalization from the constitutional bar
on a law targeting one named person to a bar on laws targeting a named group of persons, and
argues that this is the real basis of Romer. See Amar, supra note 61, at 208-20, 223-28; see also
Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 258 (1996)
(arguing that Romer is undergirded by the principle that “forbids the government from desig-
nating any societal group as untouchable”). But as Amar says, “Not all laws that name suffer
this fatal flaw—only those that, in Kennedy’s words, reflect ‘animus towards the class.’” Amar,
supra note 61, at 226 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 634). In other words, it is not only targeting
the single named group itself that is essential, but targeting-plus-animus. But given that tradi-
tional bills of attainder might have been passed not because of animus but for very rational rea-
sons—treason, for example—it is unclear that the principles undergirding the Attainder Clause
are really the driving force here.
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Such subtleties were largely eclipsed by the seemingly tolerant
tone of the Romer opinion, a case that has come to stand for a social
proposition—that animus against homosexuals is to some extent ille-
gitimate—as much as a legal-doctrinal one.75 In the words of one gay
rights activist, “[i]n Romer, the court turned an important corner and
recognized that gay men and lesbians in this country have legitimate
claims for equality. . . . That’s an important tone to set for the Con-
gress, state legislatures and courts around the country.”76 Or, in the
words of another activist, writing just before the Romer decision,
the tone of Bowers was not lost on the nation. Many Americans see
the Supreme Court as something of a constitutional conscience for
the country. The message of Bowers was that there is nothing im-
moral about raw hostility to lesbians and gay men. If the Court . . .
embraces that basic American notion of a level playing field in poli-
tics and upholds the Colorado Supreme Court, the public debate
about lesbians and gay men is likely to change significantly, and be-
come much more open to our plea for equal treatment.77
Though, in fact, the judicial success rates for “gay rights” cases since
Romer have been decidedly mixed, at the core of Romer is a conclu-
sion similar to that mainstream-and-margin-defining move in Loving:
75. Professor Amar reads Justice Kennedy’s opinion as cognizant of this fact, and “written
for fellow citizens.” Amar, supra note 61, at 221. On the impact of Romer and post-Romer litiga-
tion, see generally Andrew M. Jacobs, Romer Wasn’t Built in a Day: The Subtle Transformation
in Judicial Argument over Gay Rights, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 893 (1996) (suggesting that Romer sig-
nals a shift in the way American law conceives of gays and characterizes questions of gay rights);
Andrea M. Kimball, Note, Romer v. Evans and Colorado’s Amendment 2: The Gay Movement’s
Symbolic Victory in the Battle for Civil Rights, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 219 (1996). Robert Dodson
disputes the conclusion that Romer really was much of a victory after all, noting that because
Romer did not require heightened scrutiny, and because Bowers remained good law, the case
has offered little protection for homosexuals. See Dodson, supra note 47, at 289-311.
76. Joan Biskupic, For Gays, Tolerance Translates to Rights, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1999, at
A24 (quoting Mary Bonauto, the Civil Rights Director of Gay and Lesbian Advocates and De-
fenders) (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Matt Coles, In Romer v. Evans, the Gay Rights Movement Nears a Crossroad (last
modified Sept. 27, 1995) <http://www.aclu.org/news/n092795b.html> (on file with the Duke Law
Journal). In this statement, Coles, the Director of the ACLU National Lesbian and Gay Rights
Project, expressed his concern over the Supreme Court’s ability to influence public morality. See
id.
NOW Action Vice President Rosemary Dempsey said of Bowers: “This decision makes
it clear that homophobia is not a valid justification for the government to discriminate.” Kim-
berlee Ward, Supreme Court Victory Protects Lesbian/Gay Rights, National NOW Times (last
modified Oct. 1996) <http://www.now.org/nnt/11-96/lesbian.html> (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
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that “animus against homosexuals” is no longer in the mainstream. In
cultural terms, Romer largely overruled Bowers.
C. Reconciling Bowers and Romer
But in strictly legal terms, Romer v. Evans did not overrule Bow-
ers v. Hardwick. It never mentioned Bowers, it did not impliedly or
expressly void the statute upheld in Bowers, and it was only con-
nected to Bowers by a commonality of subject matter. Yes, Romer
was a new Supreme Court statement on the constitutional implica-
tions of sexual orientation, and it seemed to have a certain tone of
tolerance. But lawyers do not generally suppose that, say, a recent
free speech case overrules a previous one simply because it departs in
some way from some strand of implicit reasoning in the earlier deci-
sion or has a different tone. In fact, although it would be reasonable
to suppose that Bowers is something less than perfectly good law—
surely Romer changes the landscape somewhat—I will show in this sec-
tion that the extent to which Romer actually overturns Bowers is ex-
tremely limited. Romer did not occlude Bowers; it circumscribed it—a
judicial move that validates what goes on within the drawn circle even
as it excludes that which is beyond it.
The first and clearest distinction between Romer and Bowers is
precisely that which Justice Scalia sought to elide in his Romer dis-
sent: the difference between conduct and status, a distinction which
has been the subject of gay and lesbian litigation for years.78 Bowers
allowed the prohibition of a given act because the right to engage in
that act was not protected by the Constitution. Romer, on the other
hand, invalidated an amendment that sought to allocate rights on the
basis of membership in a particular group, and even though the group
itself was not necessarily deserving of extra protection (i.e., homo-
sexuals were not seen to be a suspect class), the very act of sorting
citizens itself required some rational basis, which Amendment 2 could
not provide.
The obvious response to this is that the “rational basis” of
Amendment 2 is none other than that of Bowers: a moral disapproval
of homosexual sodomy, plus an inference that “avowed” homosexuals
are likely to engage in gay sex. However much Justice Scalia’s defini-
tion of homosexuals as “likely criminals” may make some of us likely
criminals cringe, surely he has a point. Assuming sodomy is a crime,
78. See Cain, supra note 41, at 1570-71.
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then gay men and lesbians are precisely those persons who identify
themselves by their propensity to commit a crime. If the criminaliza-
tion of sodomy withstands constitutional scrutiny, surely this next,
modest step—proscribing certain rights of likely criminals—must as
well.79
This conduct/status linkage misses at least two critical points,
however: first, it has too narrow a view of gay identity to shift the fo-
cus from status to conduct sufficiently; and second, eliding the distinc-
tion between conduct and status overlooks the real lynchpin of the
Court’s opinion in Romer: the overbreadth of the Amendment. First,
it should go without saying that reducing gay men and lesbians to
“likely criminals” offers a very pale rendition of gay identity.80 What-
ever Justice Scalia would like to think, reams of scholarship make it
indisputable—as a matter of fact, not opinion—that being gay means
much more than engaging in the act of sodomy. Ironically, the Colo-
rado Amendment’s very language seems to take this position.
Amendment 2 makes clear that it applies not only to the “conduct” of
gay sex but to “homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation” as well.81
If being gay is only, or at least constitutively, about being a likely
sodomizer, then why the interest in homophobic circles in gay politi-
cal activity, gay teachers, the “gay lifestyle”? Is “lifestyle” just a code
word for sex? Surely, if cultural attacks against non-sexual homo-
sexuals (Tinky-Winky comes to mind) are to make any sense at all,
there must be something more to gay people than sex, even in a “right
wing” view.82 And legally, insofar as Amendment 2 discriminates at
79. See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 267
(6th Cir. 1995) (“[F]or purposes of these proceedings, it is virtually impossible to distinguish or
separate individuals of a particular orientation which predisposes them toward a particular sex-
ual conduct from those who actually engage in that particular type of sexual conduct.”) (empha-
sis added); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 689-90 (D.C. Cir. 1994). State-sponsored discrimination
that is upheld by the Supreme Court hardly seems invidious, as it is officially acknowledged and
approved. See Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“After all, there can hardly
be more palpable discrimination against a class than making the conduct that defines the class
criminal.”).
80. On the equation of homosexuality with sodomy, see Anne B. Goldstein, Reasoning
about Homosexuality: A Commentary on Janet Halley’s ‘Reasoning about Sodomy: Act and
Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick’, 79 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1789-94 (1993); Halley, supra
note 16, at 1722.
81. COLO. CONST. art II, § 30b (1996), quoted in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996).
82. On the fluidity of the act/identity distinction in this context, see generally Halley, supra
note 16. Halley has since noted that the distinction has served as an important rhetorical lever in
the debates about lesbians and gays in the military. See Janet E. Halley, The Status/Conduct
Distinction in the 1993 Revisions to Military Anti-Gay Policy: A Legal Archeology, 3 GAY L.Q.
159, 164 (1996).
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all, it discriminates as much against the “non-practicing” homosexual
as against the “practicing” one. In this regard, Amendment 2 really is
about status rather than conduct: one can be a lesbian widow or sexu-
ally inactive gay man and still be discriminated against by Amend-
ment 2.
To focus on some strange species of “non-sodomizing homosex-
ual” may seem quite peculiar. Yet, as far as the Scalia view is con-
cerned, the “fit” between gays and likely criminals is absolutely essen-
tial. So let’s take the “non-sodomizing homosexual” seriously for a
moment, and consider the overbreadth of Romer. Let us entertain the
notion that biology is destiny, and that sexual orientation is as much a
feature of the human body as eye or skin color. If this is so, then a
man may be gay whether he engages in sodomy or not. However, our
hypothetical gay man is also a law-abiding citizen to the core—sort of
a Dudley Do-right in drag. Dudley identifies as a gay man, because
after all he is Dudley Do-right and will not lie about his nature. But at
the same time, Dudley carefully abstains from those acts of sodomy
which the majority of his state has decided to criminalize. Can he still
be fired from his job merely for being honest about his sexual orienta-
tion?
The non-criminal homosexual does not fall within Justice Scalia’s
formulation—hence the importance of his point that Romer was a fa-
cial challenge83—yet Amendment 2 goes out of its way to mention
orientation as well as conduct, practices, and relationships. Applying
ordinary canons of statutory construction (indeed, with a pro-Scalia
textualist bias), it is clear that Amendment 2 stands for the principle
that one can be of homosexual orientation without engaging in homo-
sexual conduct—why else would it list both? The language of the
statute directly implicated a class of people and failed equal protec-
tion in being so directed. So both Bowers and Romer can be right.
This last point brings up the constitutional doctrinal parallel to
the factual difference between conduct and status: a law implicating
substantive due process, which is act-focused, and one implicating
equal protection, which is person-focused. And while it may be very
difficult for an act to fall within the tight zones of substantive due
process jurisprudence, the very act of sorting people into classes
raises equal protection hackles. In homiletical terms, the difference
83. See Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule
Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 441 n.371 (1998) (critiquing Scalia’s argument on the basis
that it ignores the constitutional basis of the Court’s holding in Romer).
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cleaves along the adage of “Hate the Sin, but Love the Sinner”—a
potent phrase, with its roots in Augustine, that many have used to
gloss the coexistence of Bowers and Romer.84 Hating the sin, i.e., pro-
hibiting sodomy, may be permissible on the basis of “sexual moral-
ity,” because only a limited set of acts is protected by the Due Process
Clause. Hating the sinner, on the other hand, is a harder row to hoe,
because any law that sorts people into classes may run afoul of the
Equal Protection Clause, as well as deeper notions of anti-caste
equality in a constitutional democracy, and it is harder to construct a
rational basis for such a broad segregation.85
Moreover, as Cass Sunstein points out—prior to Romer, but with
Bowers particularly in mind—the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses have fundamentally different purposes within the Constitu-
tion.86 The Due Process Clause, Sunstein argues, is essentially retro-
spective and is meant to protect society’s basic core values. The Equal
Protection Clause, on the other hand, was designed to eliminate prac-
tices that existed at the time of ratification and is intended to protect
unpopular minority groups.87 Consequently, it is entirely possible for a
ban against a traditionally proscribed activity to coexist constitution-
ally with protection for the class of people who engage in that activ-
ity.88
Thus, even for the gay man who practices sodomy, the Amend-
ment covered too much of his status. Had Amendment 2 stated, “No
gay man or woman can be a school guidance counselor,” it might
have passed Romer’s muster, because the prohibition, however odi-
ous, is narrow enough that the basis for it might be a legitimate desire
not to inculcate “gay values” (whatever that might mean) in children.
84. Augustine actually said, “Cum dilectione hominum et odio vitiorum,” literally, “With
love for mankind and hatred of sins.” THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 37(8) (4th
ed. 1992). On the maxim’s relationship to Romer, see Jacobs, supra note 75, at 968 (questioning
whether prohibitions on sodomy distinguish between the act and the individual).
85. See Kenneth L. Karst, Citizenship, Race and Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 2
(1988) (concluding that “Americans have always embraced the ideal of equal citizenship” even
as they have “tolerated the subordination of groups”).
86. See Cass Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship
Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1168-69 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter Sunstein, Sexual Orientation]. This appears to be an evolution from Sunstein’s earlier posi-
tion that it might be possible to unify these and other Clause-based prohibitions in the Constitu-
tion under the rubric of “naked preferences.” Cass Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the
Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1692-93 (1984) [hereinafter Sunstein, Naked Prefer-
ences].
87. See Sunstein, Sexual Orientation, supra note 86, at 1170-74.
88. See id. at 1174-75.
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How about, “No gay man may be a soccer coach”? Harder to say. But
it is still miles away from Amendment 2 itself, which prohibited all
kinds of discrimination claims by gays, including those in contexts
where sexuality has absolutely nothing to do with the matter at is-
sue—employment at a construction site or a fast-food restaurant, for
instance.
In summary, Bowers and Romer are not in contradiction; they
may indeed be seen as complementary, notwithstanding their appar-
ent difference in tone towards the persons affected by the laws under
review. Moreover, since Romer never mentions Bowers, it would be
presumptuous to read into its silence an intent to overrule a previous
Supreme Court precedent not on all fours with the case at bar. There-
fore, in a strict legal sense, Bowers was not thus overthrown.
II.  BOWERS AGONISTES: ANTI-SODOMY LAWS, SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS, AND “FAMILY VALUES”
In all the doctrinal hair-splitting surrounding Romer and Bowers,
it is easy to lose one’s way and take for granted certain premises of
the entire project. We can easily forget how the Court got to the odd
crossroads of allowing anti-sodomy laws but not allowing anti-gay-
rights measures, and that, but for Justice Powell’s swing vote, the
landscape would have looked utterly different, with a right to conduct
one’s sex life simply the next, logical step in the progression of sub-
stantive due process jurisprudence. We might also forget that Geor-
gia’s sodomy law was never subject to strict scrutiny, because Justice
White did not locate a right to sodomy within either Supreme Court
precedent or the Court’s dominant theories of substantive due proc-
ess generally. I now wish to return to that point and consider the locus
of homosexual sodomy within the geography of existing Supreme
Court precedent on substantive due process.
The argument of this part is as follows. Even if we construe sub-
stantive due process cases relatively narrowly (and the last decade of
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the subject says that we must), cases
decided by the Court in the last forty years clearly state that the Four-
teenth Amendment prohibits government interference with certain
core, fundamental liberties. Even within the restrictive boundaries set
by the Court in recent years, “the relationships that develop within
the unitary family” are the core of the protected liberties.89
89. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
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In 1986, it was plausible to state that “[n]o connection between
family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual ac-
tivity on the other” could be shown to exist.90 But now, a decade and a
half later, the statement is no longer credible. Gradual, bitterly con-
tested changes in American family life, which fall squarely within the
exceptions to stare decisis as delineated by the Court’s jurisprudence,
require us—without regard for our personal opinions on the subject—
to see the homosexual family as a species of the American family as a
matter of sociological fact. Thus, while the Court need not, and
should not, force a particular definition of “family” on Congress and
state legislatures, the right of gay families to define themselves as
“families” must be protection of the family if such protection is to
have any meaning.
Under such a theory, it may yet be permissible for states—to
choose but one recently controversial example—to bar gay marriage.
There may (and should) be continued public soul-searching over
whether these new families deserve other forms of official state re-
cognition, because there is a difference between recognizing that such
families may exist and placing state imprimaturs of approval on them.
But because gay families do exist, they must, as dictated by the last
forty years of substantive due process precedent, be permitted to en-
gage in their constitutive activities. As such, the nexus that was miss-
ing in Bowers is now present: the link between gay sexual activity and
the family is as easy to demonstrate as that between straight sexual
activity and the family. And once that link is made, strict scrutiny ap-
plies to laws governing, inter alia, sodomy—not by any extension of
doctrine, but by simple application of conservative doctrine to the
facts. As it is very hard to see what compelling state interest is served
by sodomy laws, Bowers falls, not because of court cases or legal
theories, but because of history.
In the first section of this part, my goals are to delineate briefly a
conservative understanding of substantive due process and to show
how that doctrine protects activity related to the family. Although
this necessarily requires an unfortunate wade into the miasma of sub-
stantive due process law, we need only get our feet wet to be able to
progress. Those who want to take on faith that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects activities that are essential to the family may
wish to skip the substantive due process swamp altogether.
90. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
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In the next section, I will show how it is incoherent for anyone—
radical, liberal, conservative, whatever—to deny that, as a factual mat-
ter, gay families may be plausibly considered families. Thus, putting
theory and fact together, I conclude in the second section of this part
that gay families fall within the zone of protection sketched out in
Bowers itself, and note in the third section the consonance between
this conclusion and the kinds of changes in historical fact envisioned
in the Court’s stare decisis jurisprudence. Finally, in the last part of
the Essay, I will comment on what all of this might mean, and
whether anyone should care about Bowers anyway.
A. Remembering Substantive Due Process
Everyone knows that no one knows what “substantive due proc-
ess” really is. Judge Easterbrook believes it to be an oxymoron.91 John
Hart Ely has called it a “contradiction in terms—sort of like ‘green
pastel redness.’”92 Its history, from contracts and social statics,
through footnotes and penumbras, to its current association with con-
traceptives and abortions, is tangled, and at times, just plain bizarre.93
But then again, the doctrine, or something like it, has determined
dozens of crucial, close cases before the Supreme Court. It clearly has
some meaning, rooted in the idea that there are some liberties so
foundational that no process can duly strip them from an American
citizen—that there are some matters into which the state cannot in-
trude. Perhaps the textual foundation of this concept is obscure (or
misplaced; perhaps it should be the Ninth Amendment, or the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause94), but the concept itself is not so arcane.
It is also becoming increasingly apparent that much of the debate
about substantive due process is really a subset of a larger interpreta-
tive debate that dates back millennia: the debate between the letter
and the spirit of the law. Are we to read the Constitution, with Jus-
tices Black and Scalia and others, according to the precise language of
the text, in which case to infer rights from “penumbras” and notions
91. See Mays v. City of E. St. Louis, 123 F.3d 999, 1001 (7th Cir. 1997).
92. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 18 (1980).
93. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Re-
view, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309 (1993) (detailing the mysteries of
due process); Toni M. Massaro, Reviving Hugo Black? The Court’s “Jot for Jot” Account of
Substantive Due Process, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1086 (1998) (discussing the impact Graham v. Con-
nor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), has had on substantive due process).
94. See ELY, supra note 92, at 22-30, 34-41; LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-3 (2d ed. 1988).
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of fairness is a kind of hermeneutic fallacy, or worse, an invention of a
do-gooder judge? Or are we to read the Constitution, with Justices
Blackmun and Douglas and others, as implicitly mandating some ba-
sic form of fairness and justice, which we might see in the interests
outlined in the Fourteenth Amendment? If we side with the latter
Justices on the interpretive question, then we are likely to side with
them on protecting a wider range of rights and interests. At the very
least, we have to engage with the question of what a protected inter-
est means, rather than question only whether an interest has been his-
torically protected in the past. But more likely, trying to discern the
spirit of the Constitution means trying to determine what “fundamen-
tal values” the document is really all about, and which, in a tiny mi-
nority of cases, will trump the expressed will of the Congress or a
state legislature.
On the other hand, if we agree that the Constitution does not
“implicitly mandate” anything, then substantive due process really is
a bizarre stretch of the imagination. It would thus make sense to bury
the doctrine entirely, or at least hamstring it by requiring that a fun-
damental right be a right that historically has been protected—i.e., by
reducing it to a tautology. It might also make sense to resurrect a
more appropriate textual source for substantive rights, most notably
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, or to simply repeat, over and
over again, that judges are not legislators; they are interpreters.
So what are we to do? The temptation is to count votes—to say,
well, the textualists have three votes, the loose-constructionists have
four or five, and then there’s one or two in the middle. So substantive
due process wins. Unless Bush wins the election, in which case it
might lose. Maybe.
We do not have to remain in this cul-de-sac, however, because, in
fact, substantive due process law has become relatively stable in the
last decade. For this reason, I think we can for our purposes happily
skirt the complex and tortured history of the Clause in trying to un-
derstand what it means today, as well as the larger hermeneutical is-
sues of letter and spirit. In fact, though substantive due process is the
doctrine that dare not speak its name—generally the phrase appears
more often in Justice Scalia’s dissents than in the Court opinions
which actually apply the theory95—rumors of its death are greatly ex-
95. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). The majority opinion, which
found a due process protection from grossly excessive punitive damage awards, never uttered
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aggerated. Indeed, by looking at four or five recent cases, I think sub-
stantive due process begins to resemble an (almost) coherent doc-
trine.96
Let us begin with Michael H. v. Gerald D.,97 a plurality opinion
written by Justice Scalia that contains the most restrictive definition
of substantive due process announced by a sitting Justice.98 It is worth
underscoring, emphasizing, and italicizing that the due process theory
in Michael H. is not a majority opinion. First, Justice Scalia was writ-
ing only for a plurality of four—Justice Stevens concurred on separate
grounds. Second, two of the four, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy,
concurred in the opinion with the unusual exception of a single foot-
note, the note containing Justice Scalia’s best statement of his consti-
tutional method. We begin here only because it is the most minimal
definition on the current judicial landscape.
Michael H. involved a child born to a married woman but not fa-
thered by her husband. The biological father sought to be declared
the phrase “substantive due process.” Justice Scalia’s dissent uses variants of the term five times,
scarequoted each time. See id. at 598-607 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. We will focus only on the doctrine as it applies to the family and related concerns, al-
though it does have applicability in other areas as well. See id. at 562 (considering excessive pu-
nitive damages). See generally Michael J. Phillips, The Nonprivacy Applications of Substantive
Due Process, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 537 (1990) (discussing various uses of substantive due process).
97. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
98. On Scalia’s theory of substantive due process in Michael H., see Laurence H. Tribe &
Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definitions of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057,
1058-59 (1990); Robin West, The Ideal of Liberty: A Comment on Michael H. v. Gerald D., 139
U. PA. L. REV. 1373, 1373-75 (1997). Justice Scalia may have taken an even more restrictive
view of substantive due process in the very recent case of Troxel v. Granville. See 120 S. Ct.
2054, 2074 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Dissenting from the Court’s decision that a parent’s
substantive due process right to raise a child cannot be abrogated solely because a court believes
it to be in the best interests of the child, Justice Scalia strongly suggested that no unenumerated
right can be protected by the courts, despite several precedents protecting a parent’s right to
raise a child as the parent wishes. See id. at 2074 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I do not believe that
the power which the Constitution confers upon me as a judge entitles me to deny legal effect to
laws that (in my view) infringe upon what is (in my view) [an] unenumerated right.”). Because
Justice Scalia’s Troxel dissent does not discuss the parameters of right-drawing, it is extrinsic to
our discussion here. It strongly suggests, however, that such discussions may now be irrelevant
to Justice Scalia. His dissent, however, was joined by no other Justice; even Justice Thomas,
writing separately, would have found a substantive due process interest at issue. See id. at 2068
(Thomas, J., concurring) (asserting that “parents have a fundamental constitutional right to rear
their children” and noting that he “would apply strict scrutiny to infringements of fundamental
rights”). Though Justice Thomas did not reach the substantive due process question, the plural-
ity certainly did. See id. at 2059-60 (listing over a dozen precedents and stating that “it cannot
now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fun-
damental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their
children”).
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the father of the baby, but was barred from doing so by a California
statute that presumes the husband to be the father of any child born
into wedlock. The Court upheld the statute against a substantive due
process challenge by the biological father. Writing for the plurality,
Justice Scalia noted that “[i]t is an established part of our constitu-
tional jurisprudence that the term ‘liberty’ in the Due Process Clause
extends beyond freedom from physical restraint.”99 Making the case
for restraint in interpreting the Clause, Justice Scalia held that it only
applies to “an interest traditionally protected by our society.”100 Fur-
thering his case, Justice Scalia quoted Justice Cardozo’s influential
opinion in Snyder v. Massachusetts,101 which held that certain rights
“so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental”102 were constitutionally protected by the Due
Process Clause.103 And yet, like Justice White’s glossing over of the
“concept of ordered liberty,”104 Justice Scalia never mentioned “con-
science” again. The rest of his exposition of Due Process Clause juris-
prudence focused only on “history and tradition,”105 concluding that
“the legal issue . . . reduces to whether the relationship [at issue] has
been treated as a protected family unit under the historic practices of
our society, or whether on any other basis it has been accorded spe-
cial protection.”106
Further, in footnote 6, Justice Scalia—now writing only for him-
self and the Chief Justice—defended the use of “historical traditions
specifically relating to the rights of an adulterous natural father,” as
opposed to those regarding “parenthood,” or some more general
value.107 He analogized Michael H. to Bowers and Roe v. Wade,108 each
of which traced the history of laws about sodomy and abortion, as
opposed to, say, sexual relations or pregnancy more generally. The
specific approach, Justice Scalia wrote, is the only approach, because
99. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 121 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
100. Id. at 122 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
101. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
102. Id. at 105.
103. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
104. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-94 (1986); see also supra notes 11-19 and ac-
companying text (presenting the facts of Bowers and the reasoning behind Justice White’s cir-
cumscribed analysis).
105. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
106. Id. at 124 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
107. Id. at 127 n.6 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
108. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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no other criterion is available for demarcating the boundaries of the
Court’s inquiry.109
Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia’s approach met with some criti-
cism, beginning with Justice Brennan’s dissent in Michael H. itself.
First, Justice Brennan wrote, the concept of tradition “can be as mal-
leable and as elusive as ‘liberty’ itself,”110 arguing that Justice Scalia
had been overly selective with his use of precedent and history. Sec-
ond, Justice Brennan accused Justice Scalia’s method of being circu-
lar: a right only exists if it is traditionally recognized and protected,
but if the right has been protected, why has the lawsuit been
brought?111 One must look beyond the immediate circumstances to
the general interest affected, Justice Brennan wrote, in order to see
what fundamental rights are at issue.112 After all, fundamental rights
are just that: fundamentals. Finally, Justice Brennan resorted to
Scalia-like barbs—calling the Scalia Constitution “a stagnant, archaic,
hidebound document steeped in the prejudices and superstitions of a
time long past.”113
Even without such characterizations, Justice Scalia’s restrictive
method does seem circular: a right is protected if it is protected, not
protected if it isn’t.114 If constitutional adjudication is ever to tran-
scend just affirming the traditional (think again of Loving v. Virginia),
there must be more. And yet, as Cass Sunstein asked in 1997, “[i]f
tradition is not decisive, what is the source of fundamental rights for
purposes of substantive due process? This is one of the largest unan-
swered questions in American jurisprudence, and it would be foolish
to attempt a full answer here.”115 As Sunstein did in his essay, how-
ever, it is possible to discover what sorts of acts have been protected
by the Court, and how they hang together in some semblance of a co-
109. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
110. Id. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
111. See id. at 138-39 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112. See id. at 139-40 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see West, supra note 98, at 1374-81 (suggesting
similarities between Justice Brennan’s and Justice Scalia’s theories of substantive due process as
revealed in Michael H.).
114. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that Justice Scalia’s
approach cannot explain a long list of cases including Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (bar-
ring the “arbitrary transfer from a prison to a psychiatric institution”); Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651 (1977) (barring some forms of corporal punishment in schools); and Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (announcing that pregnant women have a constitutional right to an abortion)).
115. Cass Sunstein, The Right to Die, 106 YALE L.J. 1123, 1136 (1997).
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herent theory. This may be insufficient theory, but for our practical
purposes, it is adequate doctrine.
Consider, for example, Planned Parenthood v. Casey,116 which,
though perhaps more famous/notorious for its discussion of stare de-
cisis, contains the Supreme Court’s most articulate recent iteration of
substantive due process law as applied to the area of family relations.
In Casey, the Court117 first reiterated the foundations of substantive
due process law, in Souterian detail, from Justice Brandeis’s concur-
rence in Whitney v. California118 to the present.119 The Casey Court
also explicitly rejected Justice Scalia’s footnote in Michael H., citing
Loving and several other cases.120 Next, reciting the holdings in Eisen-
stadt v. Baird,121 Roe v. Wade,122 Griswold v. Connecticut,123 Moore v.
East Cleveland,124 and other cases, the Court in Casey stated that to
ascertain what “liberty” is requires “reasoned judgment” of the place
116. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
117. Casey is a difficult opinion to parse because it is never clear who is speaking for whom
at what point in which opinion. However, the discussion of substantive due process related
herein occurs in Part II of the plurality opinion, which was titled “Opinion of the Court” and
which was joined by Justice Stevens and Justice Blackmun.
118. Justice Brandeis wrote:
Despite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me persuasive, it is settled
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of sub-
stantive law as well as to matters of procedure. Thus all fundamental rights comprised
within the term liberty are protected by the Federal Constitution from invasion by the
States.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), quoted in Casey, 505
U.S. at 846-47.
119. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846-51.
120. Referring to Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Michael H., the Court wrote:
It is tempting, as a means of curbing the discretion of federal judges . . . . to suppose
that the Due Process Clause protects only those practices, defined at the most specific
level, that were protected against government interference by other rules of law when
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. But such a view would be inconsistent with
our law. It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty
which the government may not enter. We have vindicated this principle before. Mar-
riage is mentioned nowhere in the Bill of Rights and interracial marriage was illegal
in most States in the 19th century, but the Court was no doubt correct in finding it to
be an aspect of liberty protected against state interference by the substantive compo-
nent of the Due Process Clause in Loving v. Virginia (relying, in an opinion for eight
Justices, on the Due Process Clause).
Id. at 847-48 (citations omitted).
The Court also cited, for the same proposition, Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94-99
(1987), Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977), Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965), and other cases. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 847-48.
121. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
122. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
123. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
124. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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of a given act within the “rational continuum” of the concept of lib-
erty.125 Of most interest to us here is the statement that
[o]ur law affords constitutional protection to personal deci-
sions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education. . . . These matters,
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment.126
The Casey dissent, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, takes a
similar view, though it distinguishes the abortion decision from “mar-
riage, procreation, and contraception” because abortion “involves the
purposeful termination of a potential life.”127 Indeed, by the time
Glucksberg is decided in 1997—and Justice Souter’s encyclopedic
concurrence in that case is written128—all members of the Court agree
that personal decisions relating to “family relationships” are pro-
tected, differing only on how narrowly or broadly to construe the
right, and whether some particular decisions (like abortion) are prop-
erly within the nest of family choices. As the Court said in 1974,
“freedom of personal choice in matters of . . . family life is one of the
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”129 A quarter century later, this core principle has re-
mained, despite the doctrinal debate and confusion; if there is a “con-
nection” between a given act and “marriage, procreation, contracep-
tion, or family relationships,” there must be a compelling state
interest in order to justify intervention.
125. Casey, 505 U.S. at 848-49 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
126.  Id. at 851; accord Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (protecting actions
with a “connection” to family, marriage, or procreation).
127. Casey, 505 U.S. at 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 325 (1980)). But see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 726-27 (1997) (stating that
“‘the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mys-
tery of human life’” was a description of activities, not a prescription for rights protection)
(quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
128. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 755-65 (Souter, J., concurring).
129. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974).
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B. Applying Substantive Due Process to Bowers II: Defining the
Family, the Kulturkampf, and “Live and Let Live”
In the name of family values, we must ask whose family . . . Senator?
Lou Reed, 1996130
Thus, if gay relationships have some connection to “family rela-
tionships,” they and their constitutive activities (including, presuma-
bly, sex) are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Now, as Jus-
tice Stevens said while concurring in Michael H., “enduring ‘family’
relationships may develop in unconventional settings.”131 The consti-
tutional $64,000 question is whether they may develop in the context
of family-like gay relationships.
As a threshold matter, the question of how narrowly or widely to
view the right alleged is barely present here: we agree it is “gay sod-
omy,” not “sexual relations” generally. The argument will be that gay
families fall within the already-protected box of the family, and that
sodomy is a part of gay families, just as decisions about sex and pro-
creation are part of families in general. I intend fully to stay within
Bowers, which itself required some “connection” between the alleged
right and the family. Thus the knotty question of how to characterize
a particular right does not enter here.
We should begin with three Supreme Court cases—two old, one
quite new—that address the meaning of the term “family.”132 Not one
130. LOU REED, Sex With Your Parents (Motherfucker) Part II, on SET THE TWILIGHT
REELING (Warner Bros. 1996).
131. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 133 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring).
132. In addition to the three cases discussed here, the Supreme Court grappled with the
definition of “family” in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431
U.S. 816 (1977), which involved procedures for removing foster children from their temporary
foster parents. Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan recognized that “biological relationships
are not exclusive determination [sic] of the existence of a family,” id. at 843, instead stating that
the importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the so-
ciety, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily as-
sociation, and from the role it plays in “promot[ing] a way of life” through the instruc-
tion of children as well as from the fact of blood relationship.
Id. at 844 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972)). But Justice Brennan ques-
tioned whether a temporary foster relationship, a creation of the state, was entitled to the same
protection as families, because “the liberty interest in family privacy has its source, and its con-
tours are ordinarily to be sought, not in state law, but in intrinsic human rights, as they have
been understood in ‘this Nation’s history and tradition.’” Id. at 845 (quoting Moore v. East
Cleveland, 413 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). The question was left unanswered because even assuming
a liberty interest existed, the Court concluded that the removal procedures in question did not
violate procedural due process. See id. at 847.
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is conclusive. On the one hand, in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,133
the Court upheld a zoning ordinance based on a very wide definition
of “family”—one which, in fact, would include gay families—against a
challenge by a group of six unrelated students who still did not fall
within its ambit.134 Though the students argued “that if two unmarried
people can constitute a ‘family’ there is no reason why three or four
may not,”135 the Court disagreed, observing that “every line drawn by
a legislature leaves some out that might well have been included. That
exercise of discretion, however, is a legislative, not a judicial, func-
tion.”136 But the Court never engaged with the question of whether
the city could really define a “family” for constitutional purposes, or
even take seriously the students’ claims that they were a family. It
seemed obvious that they were not; the students moved in separately,
as co-lessees of one village resident.137 Obviously, this is clearly distin-
guishable from a case in which two lifelong partners seek to pursue
something that closely resembles a family life; therefore, Belle Terre
does not control.
On the other hand, consider Moore v. East Cleveland,138 decided
just two years after Belle Terre. In Moore, the Court struck down a
zoning ordinance that had the effect of barring a grandmother from
living with one of her grandsons. The distinction between Moore and
Belle Terre, the Court said, was that “[t]he ordinance [in Belle Terre]
affected only unrelated individuals. . . . East Cleveland, in contrast,
has chosen to regulate the occupancy of its housing by slicing deeply
into the family itself.”139 Thus, the statute implicated a fundamental
right and failed strict scrutiny. Here, the Court did engage with the
city’s argument that the grandmother-grandson relation was not a
133. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
134. The definition of “family” at issue in Belle Terre was
[o]ne or more persons related by blood, adoption or marriage, living and cooking to-
gether as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants. A number of
persons but not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together as a single housekeep-
ing unit though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall be deemed to consti-
tute a family.
Id. at 2.
135. Id. at 8.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 2-3. Only Justice Marshall found the students’ freedom of association and
“right to ‘establish a home’” to be infringed by the zoning ordinance. Id. at 15 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting).
138. 431 U.S. 494 (1976).
139. Id. at 498.
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“family” for constitutional purposes.140 While agreeing that it had not
extended constitutional protection beyond the nuclear family, the
Court went on to quote the Harlan dissent in Poe v. Ullman,141 and
held that “[o]urs is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the
bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family. The tradition of un-
cles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household
along with parents and children has roots equally venerable and
equally deserving of constitutional recognition.”142 Of course, this em-
phasis on “tradition,” and the list of relatives is precisely what makes
Moore of little use to a reconsideration of Bowers—call it Bowers II—
despite its promising beginning. Moore does suggest that non-nuclear
families with traditions in American culture are protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, but says nothing about non-nuclear families
with only recently evolved traditions in American culture.
Still, Moore does make one critical point: that the definition of
“family” is something that itself can abridge fundamental rights, and
that, as a consequence, a legislature cannot choose a definition; the
Constitution protects not only “family matters” but also what group-
ing can legitimately be called a “family.”143 This holding makes sense,
if we think about it carefully. Yes, to quote Casey, “[i]t is conven-
tional constitutional doctrine that where reasonable people disagree
the government can adopt one position or the other.”144 But not when
a fundamental right is abridged. Casey went on to say that “[t]hat
theorem, however, assumes a state of affairs in which the choice does
not intrude upon a protected liberty.”145 In other words, if having a
gay family is a protected right, then the state cannot define it away by
saying that a gay family is not a “family.” An analogy: a state may not
140. East Cleveland argued that the Fourteenth Amendment protections extended only “to
the nuclear family—essentially a couple and their dependent children.” Id. at 500.
141. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). The Court quoted the following language: “Here we wave not an
intrusion into the home so much as on the life which characteristically has its place in the
home. . . . The home drives its pre-eminence as the seat of family life.” Id. at 551-52 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting), quoted in Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 n.12.
142. Moore, 431 U.S. at 504.
143. Interestingly, the inquiry is not dissimilar from that of abortion rights; the question in
both contexts concerns the parameters of constitutional categories. No pro-choice advocates
that I know of support “the killing of human life” or a constitutional right thereto. Their point is
that beliefs about “one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mys-
tery of human life,” Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992), are themselves “in-
timate and personal choices” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
144. Id. at 851.
145. Id.
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ban the burning of a flag, even if an overwhelming majority of the
state’s citizens see it as an odious act, by declaring that “flag burning
is not political speech” and that it therefore may be abridged.
Whether flag burning is political speech or not is a constitutional
question, and therefore it is not up to the legislature to decide. Like-
wise, if there is a fundamental right at issue, a state cannot just de-
clare it away by stating that “the gay family is not a family.” To allow
the abrogation of a possible right by defining it out of existence is not
to protect that right.
Finally, our analysis must take note of a third, quite recent case:
Troxel v. Granville,146 which the Supreme Court decided on June 5,
2000. At issue in Troxel was a Washington statute which allowed “any
person” to petition for visitation rights to a child, and to prevail if a
court found such visitation to serve the best interest of the child.147
The petitioners in Troxel were the grandparents of a child, whose fa-
ther (the petitioners’ son) had died, a fact pattern that led some ob-
servers to speculate that the Court might articulate what family-based
right grandparents possess regarding the rearing of a grandchild. This
was not the Court’s choice, however. Finding that the Washington
statute was “breathtakingly broad,”148 the Court focused its analysis on
two issues. First, the Court considered a parent’s substantive due pro-
cess right to raise a child free of state interference. Second, the Court
addressed the question of how, in the instant case, such rights were
abrogated on the basis of what the Court called a “mere disagree-
ment” over the best interests of the child, rather than respecting the
mother’s constitutionally protected determination of the child’s best
interests.149 Thus Troxel ended up being less about extended family
rights than about the constitutionally-derived “traditional presump-
tion that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her child.”150
Perhaps in response to active briefing by various legal interest
groups, however, the Court did go out of its way to note at the outset
of its reasoning that “[t]he demographic changes of the past century
  146. 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
147. Id. at 2057-58.
148. Id. at 2056.
149. Id. at 2061-63.
150. Id. at 2062. Justice Stevens’ fascinating and carefully worded dissent argues that the
Court must take account not only of the mother’s Fourteenth Amendment rights but also of
those of the child, who, Justice Stevens wrote, may have “liberty interests in preserving estab-
lished familial or family-like bonds.” Id. at 2072 (Stevens, J., dissenting). No other Justice
adopted this approach, however.
MICHAELSON.DOC 10/12/00 1:13 PM
2000] LISTENING TO THE KULTURKAMPF 1593
make it difficult to speak of an average American family” and that
“[t]he composition of families varies greatly from household to
household.”151 Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, acknowledged
that “[t]he nationwide enactment of nonparental visitation statutes is
assuredly due, in some part, to the States’ recognition of these
changing realities of the American family,”152 although ultimately the
Court held that such statutes must respect the constitutional rights of
a parent to determine the best interests of the child (absent, of course,
a finding that the parent is unfit). Moreover, the Court based Troxel’s
holding that “the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to in-
fringe on the fundamental right of parents to make childrearing deci-
sions simply because a state judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be
made”153 on the facts of the case before it; it never had to reach the
question of what rights grandparents might possess, because such
rights were not alleged by the trial court.154 To reach its conclusion,
Troxel provided dicta on the subject of the changing family, but had
no need to act on its consequences.
So, if the legislature cannot define a right away (Moore), tradi-
tion does not provide adequate protection (Loving), and families are
changing every day (Troxel), but implausible aggregations of people
are clearly not families (Belle Terre), then it seems the Court must de-
cide whether a potential family unit is, legally speaking, a “family.”
We’re back, then, to the questions asked above: how does it decide?
With neither strict tradition nor legislative guidance, should the Court
take a poll? Read the Bible? Ought it look at history and sociology,
both of which tell us that the modern nuclear family is a very recent
phenomenon, and only one of many Western ideals of family?155 Or
ought the Court use what philosophers of language and common-
sense alike tell us is the source of the meaning of words: how they are
used in society?
151. Id. at 2059.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2064.
154. See id. at 2063. The trial court based its decision on the findings that the Troxels “are
part of a large, central, loving family . . . [and] can provide opportunities for the children in the
areas of cousins and music” and that “[t]he children would be benefited from spending quality
time with the [Troxels].” Id.
155. See Craig W. Christensen, If Not Marriage? On Securing Gay and Lesbian Family Val-
ues by a “Simulacrum of Marriage”, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1713-16 (1998) (surveying
studies on the evolution of the nuclear family).
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The trouble with answering these questions is that the answers
seem ineluctably political. It seems as though if one is morally or po-
litically for “gay rights,” then, for you, it is obvious that a “family” in-
cludes gay couples—a fortiori if one is gay, and involved in a long-
term family relationship, in which case even the question is somewhat
offensive. So tradition is less important, culture and social practice
more. On the other hand, if you are against “gay rights,” then you
would likely invoke “traditional” notions of the family (however fic-
tional they may be156) deliberately to resist their erosion. The political
ends can easily determine the methodological means.
We can recast the question as one of relativism versus absolut-
ism, itself a political polarity. On the extreme relativist end of the
spectrum is to say that anything someone wants to call a “family” is a
family: a single woman and her fish tank, a child and her dollhouse,
maybe even a organization of Mafiosi. Presumably, few of us would
agree that these “families” are entitled to constitutional protection,
however. Even if we have little interest in arguing with any of these
“families” (particularly the Mafiosi), the use of “family” in this way
empties the term of communitarian meaning, and renders it merely a
tool for ordering legal norms. More seriously, definitions of “family”
that depend only on “love” or “support,” without more, may resonate
with the experience of families that differ in structure from the stereo-
typical nuclear family—in the glib phrasing of Libby Post, “mother,
father, a couple of children and a pet”157—but, for legal or constitu-
tional purposes, they do not get us very far.158 Are fundamental rights
pertaining to the family to be extended to every conglomeration of
individuals (including pets) where the bonds of love and affection ex-
ist? And even if they are, who is to adjudicate love? And why love as
opposed to tribe, or kinship, or procreation? Expansive definitions of
156. On the rhetorical value of the family fiction, see generally STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE
WAY WE NEVER WERE (1992).
157. Libby Post, The Question Of Family: Lesbians and Gay Men Reflecting A Redefined
Society, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 747, 748 (1992).
158. For such wider definitions of the family, see, for example, Barbara J. Cox, Love Makes
a Family—Nothing More, Nothing Less: How the Judicial System Has Refused to Protect Nonle-
gal Parents in Alternative Families, 8 J.L. & POL. 5, 5 n.1 (1991); Mary Patricia Treuthart,
Adopting a More Realistic Definition of “Family”, 26 GONZ. L. REV. 91, 91 (1990/1991). As will
become clear, ingredients like love and support are important to my own sociologically-derived
agnosticism regarding what a family “is,” because they are constitutive elements of many
(though not all) families in America today. But my (non-)definition does not depend on these
elements alone; it also requires actual social practice and acceptance by at least some parts of
American society.
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the “family,” however they may capture the personal meaning of
“family” for many people, render the term nearly empty of legal use-
fulness. We are all Humpty-Dumpty (“When I use a word . . . it
means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.”159) and
common meaning is impossible. Since adjudication depends on com-
mon meaning of the terms to be adjudicated, the extreme relativist
position fails as a workable norm for deciding legal cases.160
The other extreme position is to be as selectively, minimalisti-
cally historical as possible: a family is only that which has historically
been recognized as such—a man, a woman, a marriage contract, with
children optional. If the relativist position excelled in flexibility but
lacked clarity, the minimalist position is the exact opposite: it is easy
to know exactly what is and is not a family—although prior to the
postwar “nuclear family,” an innovation combining the contingencies
of the period with romanticized myth,161 many family arrangements
commonplace in America would strike us as hardly being families at
all; children farmed out to work far from home, extended families of
slaves, marriages in which cohabitation was infrequent at best, and so
on. But even if we set actual historical practice aside in favor of “tra-
dition,” we are back at the Loving problem: what about when the tra-
ditional definition of “family” itself runs afoul of constitutional
norms? That is, to define the family only in terms of one view of tra-
dition (since one can find multiple conflicting traditions, depending
on where one looks) may replicate the problem of improperly defin-
ing a right out of existence by choosing a definition that is so narrow
as to remove from consideration “real” families that may demand
constitutional protection. This problem is particularly acute today.
Although recent polls show up to 90% of respondents favoring “old-
fashioned ideas about family and marriage,”162 the fact is that “tradi-
tional nuclear families” are only a small minority—less than 25% of
American households—and alternative families are becoming more
and more common.163 The Court in Troxel noted that as of 1996, chil-
159. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 69 (1931).
160. The extreme relativist position would also fail if we wished to avoid the slippery-slope
of incestuous families and the like, although I think that particular slippery-slope is rather over-
used.
161. See COONTZ, supra note 156, at 25-29 (highlighting the novelty of the 1950s family).
162. Craig W. Christensen, Legal Ordering of Family Values: The Case of Gay and Lesbian
Families, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1299, 1310 (1997).
163. See id. at 1310-11 (citing census statistics and COONTZ, supra note 156, at 21); Martha
Farnsworth Riche, The Future of the Family, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Mar. 1991, at 44 (docu-
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dren living with only one parent accounted for 28% of all children
under age eighteen in the United States.164 Even more importantly for
gay families, unmarried, cohabiting couples, for instance, are growing
in number—as of 1993, there were 5 million such couples in Amer-
ica—about 1.5 million of which consist of same-sex “partners.”165 In
such a changing social context, the risk of underinclusion is large in-
deed.
One might take a modified-minimalist approach to defining the
family: a “family” is a traditional family except where tradition clearly
violates a constitutional norm, such as equal protection. That’s fine as
far as it goes—it gets around the Loving problem, for example, by ex-
cluding the anti-miscegenation definition of family/marriage because
of its transgression of equal protection. But, again, the trouble is that
sometimes whether a constitutional norm exists depends on whether
there is a family—the instant case, for example. In such cases, to use
the modified-Scalia definition of “family” is circular: a constitutional
norm depends on whether there is a family, but whether a non-
traditional family is a “family” or not depends on whether there is a
constitutional norm implicated. In other words, gay families are fami-
lies if to deny them the status of “family” would violate a constitu-
tional right of gays—but the only way to know whether there is a con-
stitutional right in play or not is to determine whether gay families are
families! So much for modified-Scalia.
What, then? One somewhat nihilistic alternative is to just look it
up, a method that would surely make Aristotle wince but which does
seem to crop up in a surprising number of judicial opinions. The
prospects are grim. Webster’s Third International Dictionary gives us
two-thirds of a column on the word “family.” But even if we exclude
the irrelevant definitions (e.g., related chemical compounds), what’s
left is of little use. Is a family “a group of persons of common ances-
try”? “[A] male and female animal with their young”? That doesn’t
seem to include enough. “[A] group of individuals living under one
roof”? That seems to include both too much and too little. Here’s a
better one: “the body of persons who live in one house and under one
head including parents, children, servants, and lodgers or boarders.”
menting changes in American households); see also Martha Minow, The Free Exercise of Fami-
lies, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 925, 930-32 (describing the modern transformation of the 1950s fam-
ily).
164. See Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2059 (2000) (citing a 1998 census report).
165. See Christensen, supra note 162, at 1312-14 (citing census statistics).
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But that seems too expansive for constitutional purposes. So does “a
group of persons sharing a common dwelling and table considered for
census purposes to include at one extreme a single person living alone
and at the other the residents of a hotel or the inmates of a prison.”166
The best definition Webster’s gives is “the basic biosocial unit in soci-
ety having as its nucleus two or more adults living together and coop-
erating in the care and rearing of their own or adopted children.”167
Seems to get it right for straight and gay families (except I’m not sure
that children are essential) but, really, is this what constitutional in-
terpretation is about? Webster’s?
Maybe, then, we should look more deeply into the concept of the
American nuclear family and inquire what its functions and structures
are—what are, in the words of one New York court, “normal familial
characteristics.”168 Here, too, however, there is bound to be dispute.
For Craig Christensen, nuclear families involve “compassionate co-
habitation,”169 the rearing of children, and some degree of auton-
omy.170 Very well; gay families can involve these things. But one could
still respond that “family” also necessarily includes the transmission
of communal values—which might include religious, heterosexist val-
ues—or biologically producing children. How to arbitrate this dis-
pute? Once again, without evidence, conceptual and functional defini-
tions are a matter of opinion.
Likewise, public opinion polls are, by definition, measures of
“opinion” rather than constitutional definition or actual societal prac-
tice, although it is worth at least parenthetically noting that, as early
as 1989, nearly three-quarters of those polled selected “a group of
people who love and care for one another” as a definition of the
166. In fact, the census definition is more restrictive: “A family group is any two or more
persons . . . residing together, and related by birth, marriage, or adoption.” BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20, NO. 484,
MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1994, at B-1 (1996). Of course, this
definition is entitled to no more deference than any other, since if it is unconstitutional, it is of
no moment that an executive agency has adopted it.
167. This and all the preceding definitions are from WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 821 (1993).
168. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 54 (N.Y. 1989).
169. Christensen, supra note 155, at 1716 (quoting JAN E. DIZARD & HOWARD GADLIN,
THE MINIMAL FAMILY 139-42 (1990)).
170. See id. at 1716-18.
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“family,” over “a group of people related by blood, marriage, or
adoption.”171
We need evidence, not declarations, and I think we have to re-
turn to society for that evidence, for three reasons. First, because for
a term that is as unstable and contentious as “family,” it’s hard to see
where else to turn; competing conceptual definitions may be equally
valid, and the choice between them seems inexorably political. Sec-
ond, the family unit is a social unit; it has import not only for the indi-
vidual members of an individual family but for the culture in which
that family interacts. In the words of the California Supreme Court,
[t]he family is the basic unit of our society, the center of the
personal affections that ennoble and enrich human life. It
channels biological drives that might otherwise become so-
cially destructive; it ensures the care and education of children
in a stable environment; it establishes continuity from one
generation to another; it nurtures and develops the individual
initiative that distinguishes a free people.172
Some of these functions of the family are individually oriented,
others socially oriented; thus, both aspects of the family—individual
love, support, etc., and social function, role, and acceptance—may be
essential.173 Third, taking a cue from both Wittgenstein and common
sense, social usage is where terms acquire their meaning; words mean
what they mean in usage and communication, not in an idiosyncratic
(and probably impossible) private imagination. Humpty-Dumpty has
it wrong because to use a word in a way no one can understand is not
to “use” a word in the conventional sense; it is to misuse it.
So, given the multiplicity of family structures in American social
practice, what is the evidence as it pertains to gay “families”? In the
fourteen years since Bowers was decided, the kulturkampf over gay
171. Treuthart, supra note 158, at 97 (citing Jean Seligmann, Variations on a Theme,
NEWSWEEK, Special Edition, Winter/Spring 1990, at 38).
172. De Burgh v. De Burgh, 250 P.2d 598, 601 (Cal. 1952).
173. For Laurence Tribe, the protection of family is not a random outgrowth of Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence but is the result of the structure of American society itself: “‘[T]he
family unit does not simply co-exist with our constitutional system,’ but ‘is an integral part of it,’
for our ‘political system is superimposed on and presupposes a social system of family units, not
just of isolated individuals. No assumption more deeply underlies our society . . . .’” LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15.19, at 1414 (2d ed. 1988) (quoting Philip B.
Heymann & Douglas E. Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and its Critics, 53 B.U.
L. REV. 765, 772-73 (1973)); see also Case, supra note 13, at 1655-56 (suggesting that the failure
of various gay rights cases is attributable to the inability of judges to view gay relationships in
terms of long-term “couples” rather than short-term sexual behaviors).
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rights has come a long way. The corporate world has, in the last dec-
ade, accorded greater recognition to gay family units than ever be-
fore; according to a Human Rights Campaign report, at least 2,856
private and public employers offered domestic partner health cover-
age as of August 1999—compared with about two dozen in 1990.174
Among those were seventy Fortune 500 companies, including IBM,
AT&T, Disney, Chevron, and General Mills, all of whom added their
policies in the last seven years.175 Seventy-three local governments or
government agencies offer domestic partner health insurance, in-
cluding six states,176 and several localities add domestic partner regis-
tries every year.177
In addition, though faced with many obstacles, gays and lesbians
are able to adopt children and become guardians for each other in
case of illness.178 The Constitution of Vermont has been read to re-
quire the recognition of gay couples as, if not married, then the func-
tional equivalent of married.179 Many courts have taken a functionalist
view of the family and recognized same-sex partners as family mem-
bers—the New York Court of Appeals, for example, prohibited the
eviction of a gay man from a rent-controlled apartment following his
partner’s death, holding that he qualified as a surviving family mem-
ber because the couple were “two adult lifetime partners whose rela-
tionship is long term and characterized by an emotional and financial
commitment and interdependence.”180 Though treatment among state
174. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, THE STATE OF THE WORKPLACE 19-20 (1999)
[hereinafter HRC Report]. A 1997 KPMG Peat Marwick study reported that 13% of American
corporations offer such benefits. See id. at 19.
175. See id. at 33-34.
176. See id. at 15.
177. See id. at 17 (localities creating such registries in 1998 and 1999 included Broward
County, Florida, and Milwaukee, Wisconsin); see also Treuthart, supra note 158, at 100-05 (de-
tailing typical registration procedures and citing registries established in Seattle, Washington,
and in the California cities of West Hollywood, Santa Cruz, and Berkeley).
178. See Christensen, supra note 162, at 1301, 1406-14 (demonstrating that cases from vari-
ous jurisdictions have either explicitly or implicitly upheld the legality of gays and lesbians
adopting children).
179. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886-88 (Vt. 1999).
180. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49, 54 (N.Y. 1989); see also Donovan v. Workers’
Compensation Appeals Bd., 187 Cal. Rptr. 869, 873 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (allowing one gay
partner to receive benefits if he could demonstrate dependence on his deceased partner). But
see, e.g., Coon v. Joseph, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873, 876-78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a gay man
did not have a sufficiently close relationship with his life partner to recover in tort for emotional
distress after witnessing an assault); Weigand v. Houghton, 730 So. 2d 581, 585-88 (Miss. 1999)
(denying custody of a child to a wealthy, gay father, despite evidence of abuse from an economi-
cally disadvantaged, straight stepfather).
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courts is very uneven,181 it at least makes sense to discuss gay and les-
bian family law as a coherent subject, unlike in 1986.182 Changes in so-
cial attitudes have already yielded important gains in gay civil rights
generally, from employment contexts to school groups,183 and they
matter constitutionally as well.
Even apart from judicial recognition, gay family groupings exist
and are visible in American culture now as never before. Gay men
and women are on television and in movies, portrayed as parts of
families, in a way unthinkable in 1986. There are American Express
ads targeting lesbian couples,184 Budweiser ads with men holding
hands (and I don’t mean high-fiving), gay couples embracing on Who
Wants to be a Millionaire, and, unlike the early 1980s, when gay tele-
vision and film characters were few and far between (and, more often
than not, dying of AIDS) non-marginal gay characters in dozens of
films, sitcoms, even Survivor. HBO specials with Sharon Stone, Os-
car-winning performances by Tom Hanks, gay families in mainstream
media products from American Beauty to Friends—none of these in-
dividually render Justice White’s decoupling of sodomy from family
untenable. But together they suggest a sea change in the way gay
families function and are depicted in American cultural life.
And, of course, while there is debate within the queer commu-
nity as to whether the family is a desirable social structure or not,185
many lesbians and gay men have not waited for straight society to al-
low them the luxury of defining their families; gay commitment cere-
monies, bonds of kinship, and lifelong cohabitation are increasingly
181. For a survey of how state courts have occasionally adopted and occasionally rejected
functionalist claims to the legitimacy of same-sex families, see Christensen, supra note 162, at
1391-99.
182. As one commentator observed:
Gay and lesbian family law. Even to have spoken the phrase as recently as a decade
ago would have been only to speculate about the future . . . . There can be no doubt
today that an identifiable body of family law has started to take shape to address the
distinct problems of same-sex couples and parent-child relationships in lesbian and
gay families.
See id. at 1414.
183. See Biskupic, supra note 76, at A1.
184. See Nan Alamilla Boyd, Shopping for Rights: Gays, Lesbians, and Visibility Politics, 75
DENV. U. L. REV. 1361, 1361 (1998) (citing an advertisement from the March 1998 issue of Out
magazine).
185. See Kath Weston, The Politics of Gay Families, in RETHINKING THE FAMILY: SOME
FEMINIST QUESTIONS 119, 122-23 (Barrie Thorne & Marilyn Yalom eds., 2d ed. 1992) (discuss-
ing both sides of this debate).
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common on the American cultural landscape.186 Thousands of gay
families, unlike reductios ad absurdum like the Belle Terre students or
incestuous unions, fulfill the personal and social functions tradition-
ally associated with the family, identified by a recent California task
force as (1) maintaining the physical health and safety of family
members by providing for their shelter, food, clothing, health care,
and economic sustenance; (2) providing conditions for emotional
growth, motivation, and self-esteem within a context of love and secu-
rity; (3) helping to shape a belief system from which goals and values
are derived, and encouraging shared responsibility for family and
community; (4) teaching social skills and critical thinking, promoting
lifelong education, and providing guidance in responding to culture
and society; and (5) creating a place for recreation and recuperation
from external stresses.187 To reiterate, the presence of these conditions
is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of a constitutional
family. But they are indicia that the self-definitions of gay families are
not frivolous. They suggest that, for large segments of the population,
gradually evolving social realities have created new, plausible defini-
tions of “family,” the determination of the parameters (and the car-
rying on of constitutive activities) of which is protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment.
Hold on a moment, you might say: as much “progress” as there
has been toward legitimizing gay families, it takes two to kulturkampf.
There has also been a backlash: an increase in “family values”
rhetoric, and congressional legislation, meant to exclude gay families
and reaffirm that a “family” depends on marriage, that marriage
depends on a man and a woman, and that “protection of the family”
requires not only a ban on gay marriages but action against gays and
186. On gay commitment ceremonies, see generally TESS AYERS & PAUL BROWN, THE
ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO LESBIAN AND GAY WEDDINGS (1994); Paul Horowitz & Scott Klein, A
Ceremony of Commitment, in TWICE BLESSED: ON BEING LESBIAN, GAY AND JEWISH 126
(Christie Balka et al. eds., 1989); Alternative Commitment & Wedding Ceremonies Directory
(visited Mar. 21, 2000) <http://www.ilovethisplace.com/iccr/directory> (on file with the Duke
Law Journal) (providing a directory of commitment ceremony, gay parenting, and gay adoption
resources); RainbowUnions.com (visited Mar. 21, 2000) <http://www.rainbowunions.com> (on
file with the Duke Law Journal) (providing commitment ceremony resources).
187. See CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, PLANNING A FAMILY POLICY FOR CALIFORNIA,
FIRST YEAR REPORT OF THE JOINT SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE CHANGING FAMILY 7-8
(June 1989), quoted in Treuthart, supra note 158, at 97; see also Bruce C. Hafen, The Family as
an Entity, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 865, 894 (1989) (providing a functional definition of “family”).
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gay culture entirely.188 For many, “family” has become a code word
for opposition to “alternative lifestyles” more generally. Indeed, this
is the central irony of my argument: that “family,” usually deployed
as an anti-gay epithet, may be a key to recognizing a particular gay
right. Many courts have declined to enforce parenting contracts
between same-sex (ex-)partners, some on policy grounds.189 Gay men
and lesbians are still the object of intense social hostility,190 and,
belying the rhetoric that homosexuality is a choice free of any
environmental or biological necessity, suicide rates on the part of gay
teenagers remain high.191 For heaven’s sake, gays can’t even march in
some St. Patrick’s Day parades. It is also true that the “family” itself
is an institution that is perceived by many to be threatened by gays
and gay rights. Pat Robertson sees gay rights as “a radical plan to
destroy the traditional family,”192 and the vast majority of American
188. On the Defense of Marriage Act and related legislation, see infra note 207 and accom-
panying text. Organizations that link an anti-gay political agenda with protection of the tradi-
tional family include the Family Research Council, see, e.g., How to Protect Your Children from
Pro-homosexuality Propaganda in Schools (visited Mar. 21, 2000) <http://www.frc.org/infocus/
if99j1hs.html> (on file with the Duke Law Journal), the Traditional Values Coalition, see, e.g.,
Foreign Services Launches an Attack on the Family (visited Mar. 21, 2000) <http://www.
traditionalvalues.org/leg_wrap_afsa.html> (on file with the Duke Law Journal), and, most
relevant to the material in this Essay, Coloradans for Family Values, which spearheaded the
successful campaign for Colorado’s Amendment 2. See Dodson, supra note 47, at 286-87
(describing the respondents’ brief in Romer as depicting gays as “morally ‘depraved persons’
undermining traditional family values”); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Multivocal Prejudices
and Homo Equity, 74 IND. L.J. 1085, 1093 (1999) (characterizing the arguments set forth by the
family values organization as “hysterical and obsessional”). Stephen Carter has recently spoken
pointedly on the subject of “protecting the institution of marriage.” His view is that marriage is
not something the state should be protecting, or even ratifying, and that what would protect the
institution best would be if the state would simply stay out of it and let communities form
binding marriage contracts on their own. See Stephen L. Carter, “Defending” Marriage: A
Modest Proposal, 41 HOW. L.J. 215, 225 (1998).
189. See, e.g., Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 219 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (refusing
to enforce a custody agreement between a lesbian couple because the non-biological mother
was not a legally recognized parent); In re Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29-30 (N.Y.
1991) (refusing to grant a lesbian partner standing to enforce a visitation agreement).
190. See Jane S. Schacter, Romer v. Evans and Democracy’s Domain, 50 VAND. L. REV.
361, 368-69 (1997) (citing studies and statistics).
191. See WILLIAM B. RUBINSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION
AND THE LAW 289 (1997) (reprinting PAUL GIBSON, GAY AND LESBIAN YOUTH SUICIDE, HHS
YOUTH SUICIDE REP. 110 (1989)).
192. Christensen, supra note 155, at 1720 (quoting Steve Daley, At This GOP Convention,
Hate, Not Compassion, Was the Coin of the Realm, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 23, 1992, § 4 (Perspective),
at 4 (quoting Robertson’s remarks during the Republican Party Convention)).
MICHAELSON.DOC 10/12/00 1:13 PM
2000] LISTENING TO THE KULTURKAMPF 1603
family law still reflects the traditional nuclear family model,193 even as
such families only represent about a quarter of households today.194
The heterosexual, nuclear family may be a demographic minority, but
it is still an ideological hegemony. Right?
Yes and no. The question is what the constitutional meaning of
kulturkampf really is. My point has not been that the term “family”
now has a wider single definition than before; rather, the point is that
the term has multiple, hotly contested definitions, and that there are
good arguments on both sides. Thus the question becomes narrower:
whether the large portion of American society which believes gay
families to be families can be declared constitutionally wrong, and on
what grounds. In other words, the question is not which side is right
but whether either side can be said, by the Supreme Court or by a
legislature, to be wrong.
It should also be clear that the argument is not “I feel it is my
family, therefore it is my family.” Clearly, mere preference and a ra-
tionale to back it up are insufficient bases for defining a constitutional
category. We cannot “really want” gay families to be (or not to be)
families. Rather, there must be either a way to define the “family” in
some objective manner, or a way to operate in the absence of such a
definition. I want to suggest that looking at how the term is actually
used by large swaths of American culture, recognizing that there is
ideological (and even geographical) variation in “America,” is such a
way. It would exclude truly marginal relationships (incest, casual sex,
etc.), because history—our lived history—counts. It matters that there
are thousands of gay employees whose long-term partners receive
disability benefits, that a lesbian couple can adopt a child together,
and that there are gay members of Congress who have families and
gay families on television. And it matters that, for example, there are
no such benefits or public recognitions of incestuous or other such
relationships. All of these things matter because they are history, and
they are cultural practice. This is the difference between 1986 and
2000. Doubtless, in 1986, many gay men and lesbians felt a family
bond as strongly as they do in 2000. The constitutional difference is
that their feelings are no longer personal idiosyncrasies. As a result of
193. See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW
AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 291-93 (1989); Christensen, supra
note 162, at 1302.
194. See Christensen, supra note 162, at 1311 (citing census statistics).
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a long and unsteady change in American social behavior, they are so-
ciological facts.
Now, one might object, isn’t this non-decision really a decision in
disguise? Really, doesn’t saying that “a family may be a gay family,”
in fact impose a philosophical viewpoint? Worse yet, it may even im-
pose a counterdemocratic, minority philosophical viewpoint on the
majority. At the very least, it shuts off an important debate.
Although I will return to this subject in the conclusion, in fact,
the philosophical laissez-faire position here is not for the Supreme
Court to say, “A Family Is This, and Not That.” Rather, the proper
position here is for the Court to say, “A family may be this, and it
may be that, and the state is not going to decide for you.” The debates
may continue to rage in all fora—public, private, secular, religious,
and so on. It is even possible that the last fifteen years of cultural
change can be reversed. But because today gay families clearly are
“families” in actual, functional, societal terms, they are within the
zone of protection envisaged by the Due Process Clause: no process
can duly destroy a family.
Moreover, what “liberty” is being abridged by a judicial recogni-
tion that certain families may exist, and have the right to self-define?
Only the right to ban. And this is a strange liberty. It’s not exactly like
the right to make up your own mind for yourself and exercise your
freedom—it’s the right to make up your mind for everyone else and
to use the apparatus of the state to curtail their freedom.195 It’s not
like choosing the kind of value-world you want to live in—that any-
one remains free to do, so long as they do not threaten with state-
sponsored violence those whose fundamental values, and personal life
decisions, are different. The critical point in the argument is precisely
that violence—that the state, in banning sodomy, would be attempt-
ing to coerce the definition and constitution of a “family.” This it
cannot do. All the Court is saying, in all these controversial constitu-
tional law cases, is “Live and Let Live.”
195. This is also, I think, the difference between my view of kulturkampf and that of William
Eskridge, that “[a] key role for the judiciary is to resist Kulturkampf, and to help the political
system repudiate the legacy of Kulturkampf.” Eskridge, supra note 42, at 421. But what Esk-
ridge has in mind appears to be the co-option of the apparatus of the state by the kulturkampf:
sodomy carrying life sentences in jail or mental institutions, for example. See id. at 429-30. As
noted in the Introduction, this is closer to what the term originally meant as used by Otto von
Bismarck to refer to the state-backed effort to eradicate certain “foreign” aspects of the Catho-
lic Church (and, in the American context, the fight against the Mormon Church). See id. at 420,
426-29. In my view, though, a cultural struggle includes but also extends beyond legal and politi-
cal coercion. It includes social stigmatization, representations in cultural artifacts, and so on.
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Such folksy reasoning may seem distant from the principles of
substantive due process, but in fact it is nothing more (or less) than a
rephrasing of “the concept of ordered liberty” itself. To summarize:
1.   All agree that decisions and actions that are part of “fam-
ily life” are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, al-
though there is disagreement on exactly why that is so.
2.  Whether gay families are really “families” or not is a sub-
ject of heated, sincere dispute, but it must be beyond dis-
pute—in 2000, if not in 1986—that many people believe
that they are, that they function as families in American
society, that they obtain many family-like benefits from
the state and private actors, and so on.
3.  The decision as to whether gay “families” are families is it-
self a decision intimately associated with basic beliefs
about the family, and the state is prohibited by the Four-
teenth Amendment from making that decision for an indi-
vidual: the state cannot define a right away by defining the
terms associated with that right.
4.  Because it is apparent from our society’s use of the term
“family” that gay families are plausibly families, and be-
cause the state cannot define them otherwise, the state
may not prohibit the constitutive acts of gay family life, in-
cluding sodomy.
That is the argument. Is the ending somewhat amorphous—tele-
vision shows having constitutional significance? Perhaps it is, but it is
a far more democratic amorphism than a judge’s gloss on “traditional
morality,” whatever that is. The question is simply what basis the
Court can have for including or excluding gay families, if tradition
cannot automatically trump reasoned judgment in the definition of
terms. And what is tradition, in any event, but the social practices of
the hoary past—Leave it to Beaver instead of Dawson’s Creek. Law
listens to culture at least as much as it regulates it. That our culture is
presently struggling with the definition of the “family” ought to mean
that the power apparatus of the state cannot intrude upon such an in-
timate and private area. This is what substantive due process is all
about.
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C. Stare Decisis and Bowers II
Before concluding, we should consider this last point—how and
whether historical change can overturn settled Supreme Court deci-
sions—both because stare decisis is a non-trivial challenge to Bowers
II and because it actually helps shed light on the foregoing analysis.
“[T]he very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Con-
stitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for prece-
dent is, by definition, indispensable.”196 So said the Court in Casey,
perhaps the most famous case in history about the jurisprudential
doctrine of stare decisis, which means literally “let the decision
stand.” Citing a number of earlier cases, Casey set forth four factors a
court should consider in determining whether a prior constitutional
decision of the Supreme Court could be overturned:
[If] the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical
workability . . . whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that
would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling . . .
whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have
left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine . . .
or whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently,
as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justifica-
tion.197
Applying the Casey taxonomy to Bowers underscores how his-
torical change has rendered the old case something less than good
law. The first three conditions point toward affirmance: Bowers has
not proven unworkable; it has not engendered any particular reliance
one way or the other (at least not on the scale of Roe); and, though
Bowers’s doctrinal soundness may be debated, it is hardly Plessy or
Lochner. It is the fourth point, though, which is critical, and which has
animated the argument in this Essay: the facts have changed. By
“facts” we mean not (just) that sentiments have changed or that po-
litical correctness has grown; rather, given societal realities, it is factu-
196. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
197. Id. at 854-55 (internal citations omitted). In applying this doctrine to Roe, the Casey
majority concluded that Roe was, though controversial, not “unworkable”; decided that there
was considerable reliance on Roe both specifically and generally; identified aspects of Roe which
were, to varying degrees, still doctrinally viable; and limited the changes in facts to new times
when the fetus is viable and when the mother’s life is in danger. Casey went on to conclude that,
in contrast with Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896), Roe carries no “terrible price” and that, on the contrary, overruling it would shake the
faith of the American people in the Court itself. Id. at 862-64.
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ally incorrect to say that “homosexual sodomy has no connection to
family life.” Bowers’s structure may remain, but its foundations have
shifted—recall, Justice White’s whole discussion of sodomy law took
place only because protecting sodomy would mean creating a “new”
right rather than invoking one within existing precedents on family
relationships.198 Now, that condition has changed, and Bowers’s valid-
ity along with it.
That the doctrines of stare decisis and the parameters of constitu-
tional interpretation converge so neatly is not coincidental. The rela-
tively conservative attack on Bowers that I have tried to sketch here is
premised on the notion that new rights lurking in the Fourteenth
Amendment are few and far between. But times change, self-
conceptions evolve, and the meanings even of concepts as fundamen-
tal as the “family” shift with time. These changes are irrelevant only if
the Supreme Court sits in an ivory tower, foreclosing new nomian
possibilities by plugging its ears with old definitions. Romer did not
overrule Bowers. But America did.
III.  DOES ANYBODY CARE?
So, do we care? If the foregoing analysis is right and Bowers
should fall by its own logic, should the Lambda Legal Defense Fund
file suit tomorrow? Should the Family Research Council send out an
alarming fund-raising letter?
On the pure practical consequences of Bowers, I think the an-
swer is a weak yes. Of course, on the most narrow grounds, Bowers II
is moot: as noted earlier, the statute at issue has already been de-
clared unconstitutional by Georgia’s Supreme Court.199 On slightly
wider grounds, invalidating sodomy laws would have some effect, be-
cause they are still enforced by many municipalities and remain a po-
tentially terrorizing tactic of state intervention in intimate human
life.200 Bowers II might also reduce the ease with which courts dismiss
Romer/Equal Protection challenges by making Bowers/Due Process
arguments, as discussed in Part One, although, in the years since
Bowers, gay rights advocates have shifted their turf from removing
the persecution of homosexuality to removing the persecution of ho-
mosexuals—from Bowers to Romer, in other words. The battlefields
198. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
199. See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga. 1998).
200. See Halley, supra note 16, at 1731-33; Hammack, supra note 41, at B1; Nathan, supra
note 40, at 16.
MICHAELSON.DOC 10/12/00 1:13 PM
1608 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:1559
are no longer in the bedroom; they are at the office, in the military,
on the television, and in the hospital.
But if it was in the areas of society and culture that Bowers mat-
tered the most, it is in those same arenas that Bowers II seems so ir-
relevant. The whole point of the previous part is that societal atti-
tudes towards gay families have changed, and that Bowers II would
be following, not leading, social change. This, presumably, is what
both a conservative and a pro-democracy liberal would want the Su-
preme Court to do, but it means that the actual social impact of re-
pealing Bowers may be slight. Moreover, whatever impact Bowers II
would have, I think it is fair to say—though impossible to prove—that
it would be far less important than the kulturkampf being carried on
in America’s cultural and religious communities. “Progressives” are
tolerant of homosexuality and gay people; “traditionalists” are not.
Known sodomizers (criminals!) march yearly in most of America’s
big cities; suspected queers are beaten up in small towns. The law has
nothing to do with it. Ironically, the very societal factors that make
Bowers bad law under Casey make it more or less irrelevant. Really,
given the current disconnect between quaint, homophobic Bowers
and twenty-first-century popular culture, overturning the case might
say more about the Supreme Court than about gays and lesbians.
Justice Scalia was right: Romer was about a kulturkampf—not a
legal debate. And as that kulturkampf has progressed, the strictly le-
gal consequences of this set of cases have diminished in number and
importance. Thus, I want to spend these last few pages on the kul-
turkampf itself, or more particularly, on the interaction between our
evolving American attitudes towards homosexuality and “the law.”
First, I want to return to a thorny objection that stems from my analy-
sis: namely, whether a Supreme Court case overturning Bowers is in
some way antidemocratic or coercive or whether what we have now,
with gay rights being the subject of a public debate, is a precious case
of participatory democracy in action, and whether an intrusion by the
Court would subvert that debate. I argue, along the lines of Robert
Cover, that the Court’s allowance of multiple nomoi, or legal-
constitutive communities, would foster democratic discourse rather
than squelch it, and, because of the difference between tolerance and
acceptance, would have no effect on the debates regarding gay mar-
riage. Second, the Bowers/Romer nexus highlights an important and
sad disconnect between law and the kulturkampf: the inability of our
legal debate to address the moral questions at the heart of gay rights,
questions of biology and legalism, of religion and community. Since I
MICHAELSON.DOC 10/12/00 1:13 PM
2000] LISTENING TO THE KULTURKAMPF 1609
can imagine no more weighty questions than these, it will be with
their consideration that the Essay will end.
A. Democracy 102: Some Notes on Yelling, Nomoi, and Gay
Marriage
I have suggested that a basically conservative reading of substan-
tive due process leads to the voiding of a potentially popular piece of
legislation due to contention surrounding its key terms. One might
easily object that to do so short-circuits the conscience-searching pro-
cess of important political legislation—a process that is part and par-
cel of the kulturkampf under discussion. This is the “countermajori-
tarian difficulty” amplified: the very fact that something is being
heavily debated may lead to a judicial act that squelches debate.
Surely, even if we grant that the Court as a countermajoritarian insti-
tution has its place in American democracy, we must all agree that
public debate, even rancorous debate, on a subject as morally incen-
diary as homosexuality is a good thing, and that this is the worst time
for an elite institution to tell everyone to stop yelling.
I am all for continued yelling. Indeed, I would like more and bet-
ter yelling, as I will discuss in the next section. And that is why it is
crucial to remember that Bowers II would not end debate, and would
not say sodomy is right, good, or healthy. Indeed, the state would still
be able to curtail public displays and recognition of behaviors it finds
objectionable. Bowers II would only remove the apparatus of the
state and its jails from enforcing a majoritarian vision of goodness in
private family matters. Why would this squelch debate, which after all
is more properly one of morality than of legality? If anything, Bowers
II would make the debate more vigorous, because it would allow for
more self-definition and remove the circular argument that something
is bad because it is illegal, illegal because it is bad, and so on. In fa-
miliar terms of liberal social justice, it returns the state to where it
ought to be—to a position of neutrality with respect to differing con-
ceptions of the good life.201 In simpler terms, to repeat, it lives and lets
live.
Those of us trained in (or forced to endure) legal-economic
thinking sometimes forget that there is a difference between abridg-
201. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10-11 (1980);
RONALD DWORKIN, Liberalism, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 181, 191 (1985); H.L.A. HART,
LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 4-6 (1963); ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN
ARGUMENT ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY 138-44 (1995).
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ing the right of one party to act and abridging the right of another to
prohibit the first party from acting. Theoretically, there is no differ-
ence at all, absent whatever quantifiable difference in utility that ex-
ists between, say, your right to play your radio loud and my right to
live in peace and quiet—and those “black box” differences are hard
to measure. Your right to listen to music, and my right to stop you
from doing so so that I can read, are just two interests which must be
reconciled by setting up some kind of regime to allocate the right of
noise. But is this really true in the case of anti-sodomy laws? Some
people may suffer harm by having to put up with morally objection-
able acts of sodomy taking place in their neighborhood. But is harm,
offending of sensibilities, really equal to the harm suffered by a gay
man who is forbidden from obtaining the same sexual and emotional
fulfillment as a straight man?
Yes, pluralism does impose costs. Moving from the language of
law and economics to that of Robert Cover, we might say that plural-
ism restricts the ability of the majority to create the kind of “norma-
tive universe” they want to live in.202 But let’s pursue the Cover line of
thinking more fully. At the same time that pluralism diminishes one
majority’s attempt to create a normative universe, it allows the crea-
tion of many such universes. More precisely, Bowers II removes the
threat of force to impose one “imperial” nomos—backed up by force,
with the purpose of maintaining an orderly society—and allows indi-
vidual communities to construct several “paideic” ones dependent not
on force but on communities of meaning, such as religious communi-
ties.203
True, the unlimited proliferation of legal meaning is impossible
within a cohesive society, and limiting the power of “imperial” states
is in some ways jurispathic. But inasmuch as sodomy laws are truly
based on “morality,” they are a case of one, hegemonic nomos co-
opting the apparatus of the state to convert its paideic normative uni-
verse into an imperial one—to move from the church house to the
state house. Prohibiting this move, really, is the only “cost” imposed
by pluralism. Moral censure, media campaigns, promises of hellfire,
philosophical reasoning, recourses to Darwin, immunological theo-
dicy, stories of Roman decadence, pictures of lovely straight children,
social advancement, parental love—all of these remain tools of one
opposed to homosexuality. He just doesn’t have the jailhouse.
202. Cover, supra note 10, at 6-7.
203. Id. at 12-13.
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Nor does the sketch I have drawn of Bowers II imply any kind of
societal approval of homosexuality—in particular, gay marriages. In-
teresting philosophical analyses of the issue have begun to work their
way into the literature,204 and I think there are compelling policy ar-
guments in favor of such recognition205—although I also agree with
Richard Posner that for the Supreme Court to coerce states to recog-
nize gay and lesbian marriage, would be an unprecedented act of
countermajoritarianism.206 There are even more compelling argu-
ments that Congress’s effort to pre-empt such recognition, i.e., the
Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), is unconstitutional.207 And if
the recent events in Vermont show us anything, it is that a court deci-
sion on gay marriage or gay rights need not cut off debate; on the
contrary, it can invite and stimulate it.
204. See, e.g., John G. Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 1119, 1125 (1999) (concluding that opposition to same-sex marriage has its
roots in conflation of biology and gender); John Finnis, The Good of Marriage and the Morality
of Sexual Relations: Some Philosophical and Historical Observations, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 97, 126-34
(1997) (arguing that only heterosexual marriage can actualize the “good” of marriage by com-
mitting both partners to a form of sexuality that connects the sex act to a permanent, procrea-
tive bond between them).
205. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM
SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT passim (1996) (providing policy and constitu-
tional arguments in favor of same-sex marriage). Chapter three of Professor Eskridge’s book
identifies, and debates, the many thinkers within the gay community who oppose gay marriage
for a variety of reasons. See id. at 51-85; see also Linda S. Eckols, The Marriage Mirage: The Per-
sonal and Social Identity Implications of Same-Gender Matrimony, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L.
353, 407 (1999) (arguing that thrusting same-sex marriage on the nation “is simply too much at
one time, for gay men and lesbians, and for society”); Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We
Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of
Gender in Every Marriage”, 79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1536-37 (1993) (opposing efforts to make the
right to marry a priority for the lesbian and gay rights movement).
206. See Richard A. Posner, Should There Be Homosexual Marriage? And If So, Who
Should Decide?, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1578, 1584-85 (1997). This is also Cass Sunstein’s concern in
Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L. J. 1, 27 (1994).
207. On the unconstitutionality of the DOMA, see Melissa Rothstein, The Defense of Mar-
riage Act and Federalism: A States’ Rights Argument in Defense of Same-Sex Marriages, 31 FAM.
L.Q. 571, 577-82 (1997) (discussing DOMA and the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Scott
Ruskay-Kidd, The Defense of Marriage Act and the Overextension of Congressional Authority,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 1435, 1482 (1997) (“DOMA short-circuits the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
conflicts with basic understandings of federalism, and strays from the substantive commandment
of the constitutional text itself.”); Sherri L. Toussaint, Defense of Marriage Act: Isn’t it Ironic . . .
Don’t You Think? A Little Too Ironic?, 76 NEB. L. REV. 924, 964-78 (1997) (advancing several
arguments against DOMA’s constitutionality); Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Less Perfect Un-
ion, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1996, at E11 (discussing DOMA and the Full Faith and Credit
Clause). On DOMA’s effect on conflicts law, see generally Stanley E. Cox, DOMA and Con-
flicts Law: Congressional Rules and Domestic Relations Conflicts Law, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV.
1063 (1999).
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However sympathetic I am to these points, I do want to call at-
tention to the distinction between obtaining a license from the state
to change one’s public status and simply pursuing the life one wishes
to lead. In the Bowers II rationale I have sketched, the Supreme
Court remains agnostic on the merits of gay families: it only recog-
nizes that such families may reasonably be considered families by
some, and that that act of self-definition is itself protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. In contrast, gay marriage makes an affirma-
tive statement on the part of the state. Gay marriage is not “live and
let live”; it is a public, communal institution which depends on the
community for definition. The difference is between tolerating some-
thing that may be morally reprehensible and approving of that some-
thing. It should not be too much of an overstatement to label that dif-
ference the fundamental lever of pluralistic democracy.
There is a second, more subtle, difference between gay marriage
and Bowers II: the nature of the right in question, and the attendant
terms to be defined. The right to marry as recognized by the Supreme
Court is something that exists as part of the rights implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty—but not necessarily the right to define the
term “marry.” This makes sense for the reasons just discussed: “mar-
riage” is a term whose definition is more public than private, less a
matter of pluralism and more a matter of community consensus.
While the Fourteenth Amendment may yield a right to determine the
contours of one’s family (within the bounds of reason), no affirmative
state obligations flow from that right precisely because it is a matter
of “private concern.” “A right to privacy” may cut both ways. So
while the argument in this Essay does not foreclose arguments for gay
marriage, it does not advance them either. Because of the nature of
“privacy,” marriage is not the same, constitutionally speaking, as the
family—something which, in the non-constitutional realm, thousands
of unmarried couples, gay and straight, already know.
B. Engaging with the Kulturkampf: Adjudication and Black Boxes
The argument of this Essay has been that courts, particularly the
Supreme Court, must listen to the kulturkampf in determining the
meaning of critical constitutional terms. And yet, much of what the
Court will hear is nonsense. For anyone familiar with queer theory or
anyone who even happens to know many gay people, hearing much
mainstream legal and political debate about homosexuality is like lis-
tening to sixth graders discussing Shakespeare: homosexuality is “un-
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natural,” sodomy is a “sin,” or, alternatively, “it’s my life,” or, “we’re
here-we’re queer-get used to it.” Of course, sloganeering is part of
politics. But each of these claims actually contains a package of con-
stitutionally relevant suppositions: that there is a natural way of hu-
mans to be (from which some choose to deviate), or that America
must tolerate something it morally disdains, simply as a matter of psy-
chological maturity. Maybe it’s fine for politicians and demagogues to
just sell such claims to their audiences, without any real analysis of
the underlying issues that are implicated by them, but what about
when these claims are presented to a court? What does “listening to
the kulturkampf” mean then?
As Richard Posner has recently demonstrated in Sex and Rea-
son,208 it is possible for a jurist to break through the black boxes of
“morality,” deployed by both sides of the gay rights debate, and
meaningfully adjudicate the claims within.209 I want to argue that to do
so is necessary for courts to do their jobs. Sifting fact from fantasy is
not an intrusion of law into the domain of morality, but is part and
parcel of what the law must do, particularly in a contentious area such
as the gay rights kulturkampf, because competing “moral” rationales
often must be adjudicated. Let us suppose, for example, that Justice
Scalia was right that the Coloradans who voted for Amendment 2
authentically believed that gay people posed a threat to the mainte-
nance of traditional, straight nuclear families. Would they not then be
constitutionally justified in taking steps to limit the rights of gays?
The answer to that question simply must penetrate the black box
of “morality” because, as Loving must tell us, a state’s “moral” choice
can sometimes be constitutionally wrong. Suppose, for instance, sex-
ual orientation is like race—not a choice of lifestyle, as in the rhetoric
of the Right, but a biological fact about a human being. If this is so
(the view known as “essentialism”), then the next Colorado would
have a very difficult argument to make: that it is entitled to place a
disability on a group of people because of the way they were born. If,
on the other hand, sexual orientation is not like race but rather is
something “chosen,” or at least conditioned by environmental factors
that we can control (the view known as “constructionism” or “con-
208. RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992).
209. See id. passim; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Social Constructionist Critique of
Richard Posner’s Sex and Reason: Steps Toward a Gaylegal Agenda, 102 YALE L.J. 333, 384
(1992) (departing from Posner’s libertarian approach, because the laws that gays and lesbians
seek “will enlist the state as an ally in [the] struggle against social oppression”).
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structivism”),210 then the next Colorado has a different, and to my
mind easier, argument to make—namely, that some fundamental
choices, even though they are fundamental, may invite state-
sponsored disabilities, because just as a majority may want to dis-
courage people from “choosing” to rob or steal, so too may it dis-
courage people from “choosing” to threaten the nuclear family (if in-
deed there is evidence that gay people do so). Likewise, an opponent
to an Amendment 2 has different burdens to carry, depending on the
nature of homosexuality: to argue against discrimination based on
someone’s innate characteristics is part and parcel of American liber-
alism. To argue against discrimination based on someone’s funda-
mental lifestyle choice, while it may be an important argument for gay
people to make,211 is different from, and surely harder than, saying
that orientation is “like race.” Constructivism is generally the fashion
in gay rights circles, since it helps problematize basic Western as-
sumptions about gender and hierarchy;212 but if sexuality is con-
structed, why not favor some constructions over others? Even worse:
that a characteristic be “immutable” is one of the traditional require-
ments for heightened scrutiny in the equal protection context.213 What
then?
To put it another way: Justice Scalia, in his Romer dissent, noted
that law schools may reject a job applicant
because the applicant is a Republican; because he is an adulterer;
because he went to the wrong prep school or belongs to the wrong
country club; because he eats snails; because he is a womanizer; be-
210. On essentialism and constructivism, see generally Daniel R. Ortiz, Creating Contro-
versy: Essentialism and Constructivism and the Politics of Gay Identity, 79 VA. L. REV. 1833
(1993).
211. See Jonathan Pickhardt, Note, Choose or Lose: Embracing Theories of Choice in Gay
Rights Litigation Strategies, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 951-64 (1998) (suggesting the use of legal
arguments under a choice-based theory gay identity).
212. Social constructionism is often the implicit moral claim behind surveys of unfamiliar
sexual-social practices such as William Eskridge’s examination of same-sex unions in other cul-
tures. The implicit argument is that these practices prove that universalist claims that marriage
is “naturally” or “essentially” heterosexual are false, and are merely an attempt to ground a par-
ticular social practice in a non-existent fact of nature. The very nature of “gay” and “straight”
may be socially constructed as well. See POSNER, supra note 208, at 38-60 (positing stages in the
evolution of sexual norms); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Reason, Tradition, and Family Law: A Com-
ment on Social Constructionism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1515, 1521 (1993).
213. See Yoshino, supra note 47, at 493-94 (discussing Watkins v. United States Army, 837
F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1989)). Yoshino himself does not agree with the principle that race or sex is
biologically determined, but focuses his remarks on immutability to a critique of how the term is
deployed in public discourse. See id. at 509-19.
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cause she wears real-animal fur; or even because he hates the Chi-
cago Cubs. But if the interviewer should wish not to be an associate
or partner of an applicant because he disapproves of the applicant’s
homosexuality, then he will have violated the pledge [of acceptance
of homosexuals] which the Association of American Law Schools
requires.214
Once more, are gays more like blacks, or more like Republicans?
The question, and the answer, matter constitutionally. Nor can they
simply be ignored in favor of a rationale which may not be defensible.
The Bible and “traditional morality” were put into useful service by
anti-miscegenation advocates, pro-slavery advocates, and a host of
other interest groups we now recognize as being bigots; the question
is whether the claims of such traditions can be rationally defended in
a democracy. If sexuality is “like race,” an unchosen characteristic of
a human being, then it is hard to see much of a distinction. On the
other hand, if homosexuality really is a choice, like “being a Republi-
can,” what distinguishes it from other choices that we regulate all the
time? What separates it from the reductios ad absurdum that oppo-
nents of gay rights sometimes invoke—bestiality, incest, et cetera?
How do we distinguish between them without drawing more arbitrary
lines of the “normal”? These are not only private questions of self-
definitions; they are public, constitutional questions as well.
Just adjudication requires evidence, not a concealing rhetoric of
deference to “morality.” To be sure, there is evidence on both sides.
There is evidence that our sexual orientation is determined by our
cultures—other societies had no concepts of “gay” or “straight” as we
know them today, and many men and women in those societies en-
gaged in what we would consider to be homosexual behavior, but
were never considered to be “queer” in any way. And yet there is
evidence that our sexual orientation is determined by our genes—in-
deed, the size of the anterior hypothalamus may have constitutional
import.215
214. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652-53 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
215. One of the interstitial nuclei of the anterior hypothalamus, believed to control sexual
activity, has been shown to be smaller in homosexual men than in straight men, suggesting a
biological origination of homosexuality. See Simon LeVay, A Difference in Hypothalamic
Structure Between Heterosexual and Homosexual Men, 253 SCIENCE 1034, 1035 (1991). On sci-
entific and social-scientific evidence for essentialism and constructionism, see Susanne M.
Stronski Huwiler & Gary Remafedi, Adolescent Homosexuality, 33 REV. JUR. U.I.P.R. 151, 155-
59 (1999).
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Evaluating such evidence is what judging is all about. For an aca-
demic to bracket these disputes as outside her area of interest is, per-
haps, defensible. But, echoing Posner’s critiques here, for a jurist to
think that these debates are irrelevant is irresponsible: they are neces-
sary to ascertain what theory of rights, constitutional or otherwise, are
to undergird protection (or non-protection) for gays, and to adjudi-
cate the moral claims presented by legislatures.216 Like it or not, the
hypothalamus does matter. Without entering into debates about ei-
ther the nature of homosexuality or the parameters of “fundamental”
choices about one’s identity in a liberal state, again, this is but one ex-
ample of the kinds of debate necessary for meaningful adjudication of
gay rights cases, it is hard to respond meaningfully to a non-coercive
regime that aggressively promotes heterosexuality and refuses to le-
gitimize other “choices.” To be sure, gay people can point to all sorts
of wonderful contributions they have made to politics, art, music,
dance, sports, and other areas of society. But surely it is within a
community’s collective rights to strive for the society they wish to live
in. And if that society is overwhelmingly straight, what’s wrong with
that?
Law, in evaluating these scientific and social-scientific claims, is
not “intruding” upon some sort of autonomous zone of societal de-
bate, moral theory or scientific fact. Rather, law acts as the appropri-
ate mediator between “moral” claims which depend in part on sociol-
ogy, physiology, and other disciplines for their support, and whose
theoretical underpinnings may trigger constitutional questions. Of
course, moral opinions are different from ordinary opinions—not the
least because they can be changed through moral suasion, an impera-
tive element of our political discourse. But to deny that “moral”
opinions also depend on facts is to render them private opinions ut-
terly divorced from public discourse—miniature “black boxes” im-
pervious to debate. Moreover, evoking Cover once again, moral
opinions are, when translated into law, backed up with violence.217 It’s
a shame when someone misreads Shakespeare. But it’s something a
bit more serious than that when a lesbian couple spends days trying to
get their legally adopted children on their health insurance policies,
216. I am reminded here of Kenji Yoshino’s anecdote about an interview with a federal
judge who had just heard a controversial gay rights case, but who was unaware of the use of the
pink triangle either by the Nazis or by latter-day gay activists. See Yoshino, supra note 56, at
1753.
217. See generally Cover, supra note 10; Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE
L.J. 1601 (1986).
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or a gay couple waits years to adopt a child whom a far-less-fit
straight couple could have adopted within a few months. These peo-
ple are the ones who have to be told that their families, with drawings
magnet-stuck to the refrigerator and a lawn in need of mowing, are
not “families” because other people either cannot conceive of them
or deem them to be “unnatural.” If the state chooses to use its coer-
cive power to enforce a moral choice, the reasons behind such a
choice, and the evidence for those reasons, are not issues of private
morality or theoretical interest. They are the difference between a
justified public law and a contemptible act of violence.
Doubtless, the law is a contentious forum for the debating of
such difficult and contentious issues, and some might wish that it
would just “keep out of it.” Many on the Left have feared the entry of
an uneducated, conservative judiciary into matters they think should
be beyond its control. Many on the Right have feared the intrusion of
liberal judges into matters of their personal morality. But the lesson
of what I have called the self-destruction of Bowers is that the law
cannot be deaf to the changes in society, including changes in soci-
ety’s understanding of nature, which alter the terms of legal debate.
The law should not be mute either.
For now, Bowers v. Hardwick remains the Supreme Court’s last
authoritative statement on the legal proscription of gay sexual activ-
ity. Romer v. Evans did not overturn it; if anything, much of Bowers
was solidified by the later case’s avoidance of anything that might be
seen to replace its core holdings. But Bowers has not kept pace with
the times. The kulturkampf of which Justice Scalia spoke in his Romer
dissent has engulfed America, with consequences in America’s media,
schoolhouses, offices, and households.
These cultural changes have altered terms of the debate—one
term, “family,” in particular. And yet change is nothing new under
the sun: for all its importance as an American institution, the meaning
of the “family” has always evolved, and will likely continue to do so.
Though we are not likely to agree on what constitutes a “family” any
time soon, even within the carefully patrolled boundaries of substan-
tive due process jurisprudence and stare decisis, these changes matter.
There is no need for innovative readings of the Constitution or ex-
pansions of notions of personal liberty to see how Bowers v. Hard-
wick has ceased to be good law. The Supreme Court needs only to get
real. Speaking not in some vague, abstract way and not in the fictional
language of yesteryear but speaking concretely, sociologically, and
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realistically, gay families are families. That may not have been true in
1986. But it is true now. Bowers is obsolete.
